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CRIMINAL LAW
TESTIMONIAL IMMUNITY AND THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION: A STUDY IN
ISOMORPHISM
PETER LUSHING*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prosecutors have a means of eliciting testimony from witnesses who
invoke their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
witness must testify if granted immunity. Originally, immunity was
construed by the Supreme Court as protecting the witness from prosecution for any matter about which he testified ("prosecutorial" or "transactional" immunity).' In 1972, however, the Supreme Court ruled that
it sufficed to give the witness immunity only from having his testimony
used against him.2 An immunized witness could be prosecuted for matters about which he testified, but his testimony could not be admitted
into evidence at his trial or otherwise used.3 This protection is called
"testimonial" or "use and derivative use" immunity. 4 Two ensuing
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. J.D., Columbia Law School,
1965; A.B., Columbia College, 1962.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Monrad Paulsen, my dean and my friend. I
gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Professor Edward Yorio with an earlier draft of this
article.
I See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,449-59 (1972) (citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)).
2 Id.
3 Such other uses include, for example, use as an investigatory lead to other evidence.
4 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
This article treats testimonial immunity arising exclusively from the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Testimonial immunity might also arise from that privilege in combination with other constitutional rights. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 389-94 (1968) (testimony given by defendant at fourth amendment suppression hearing
cannot be used against him at trial); cf. United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 243 (1974)
(assumption arguendo that Simmons applies to sixth amendment right to counsel).
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Supreme Court decisions have elaborated upon the meaning of "not using" an immunized witness's testimony. 5 These cases, however, are inconsistent and imprecise, and create the need for a full analysis of the
scope of testimonial immunity. Before turning to the difficulties raised
by the cases, however, a review of the mechanics of immunity is helpful.
A person subpoened or otherwise lawfully ordered to testify is required, under criminal penalty, to appear at the designated tribunal at
the time commanded, take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth, and
answer truthfully the questions put to him. 6 The fifth amendment confers upon the witness a privilege to decline to answer a question if that
answer would tend to incriminate him. 7 The claim of privilege must be
immediately announced to be exercised effectively. 8 If the interrogator
challenges the existence of the privilege, a judge determines from the
context of the question whether the witness indeed faces self-incrimination. 9 A witness who rightly claims the privilege need not answer the
question, and his silence is constitutionally excused. If the interrogator
nonetheless wants the question answered,' 0 he may apply to a court for
an order of immunity.'" Only attorneys representing the government
are empowered to apply for immunity orders, 12 which are granted
ministerially. '3
An immunity order requires that the witness testify despite his privilege against self-incrimination. The order prohibits use of the testi5 United State§ v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450
(1979).
6 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976) (penalty for false testimony); 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976) (penalty

for failure to testify). Even one who takes the witness stand voluntarily is under a duty to
answer all questions put to him. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V. For the text of the privilege, see in a text accompanying n. 38.

On the privilege generally, see infa authorities cited in note 38.
8 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1951); United States v. Sullivan, 274
U.S. 259, 264 (1927) (tax return). But see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 41, 48-49,
60 (1968) (distinguishing Sullivan and allowing invocation of the privilege after indictment for
failure to file gambling tax return). Criminal defendants, while on trial, cannot be ordered to
take the witness stand in the first instance because of the privilege, and hence do not have to
invoke the privilege. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 130 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); cf. Carter
v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981) (right to jury instruction on irrelevance of failure of defendant to testify).
9 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
10 The federal immunity statute authorizes application for an immunity order upon the
mere belief that a prospective witness will claim his privilege. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(2) (1976).
11 See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 143, at 306-07.

12 18 U.S.C. §§ 6003-6005 (1976). See supra note 11.
Commentators have suggested that defense counsel ought to be able to obtain immunity
for defense witnesses, but the courts have reacted coldly. See generall Note, Dtfenre Witness
Immunity, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 897 (1981); Comment, Defense Witness Immunity: Constitutional
Demands and Statutoy Change, 72 J. CRI m. L. & C. 1026 (1981); Note, Witnessfor the Defense: A
Right to Immunity, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1665 (1981).
13 In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 804 n.2 (1st Cir. 1974).
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mony and use of information derived from the testimony against the
witness in criminal cases, except in perjury prosecutions. 14 If the witness
refuses to obey the order to testify, he faces contempt proceedings; if he
15
testifies falsely, he faces a charge of perjury.
The court enforces the grant of immunity in any ultimate prosecution of the witness (except, as stated, a prosecution for perjury, or for
otherwise refusing to obey the immunity order itseliP6 ) by determining
at a pre-trial hearing whether the prosecutor's evidence derives investigatorily from leads supplied by the immunized testimony.t 7 Of course,
if the immunized testimony itself were offered by the prosecutor at the
trial of the witness, the judge would enforce the grant of immunity by
t8
sustaining defense counsel's objection to the offer.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions examined the meaning of testimonial immunity. In New Jersey v. Portash,19 a witness testified before
the grand jury under a grant of immunity, and was then indicted for
official misconduct. At the subsequent trial of the witness, the judge
ruled that he could be impeached through cross-examination on his immunized grand jury testimony if that testimony was materially inconsistent with his trial testimony. Ostensibly because of this ruling, the
defendant did not take the stand, and was convicted. The Supreme
14 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976), quoted infia text accompanying note 247.

An immunity

order excepts prosecutions for perjury "or otherwise failing to comply with the order." Id.
Contempt, like perjury, may place an immunized witness in noncompliance with the order to
testify. See in/ia text accompanying notes 236-40.
15 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 644 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1981) (contempt); United States v.
Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir.), cert. dened, 431 U.S. 970 (1977) (perjury).
16 See .rupra note 14.

17 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-62 (1972).
18 This scenario also applies to persons subpoened to produce documents or things, since
the act of producing a document or thing in compliance with a subpoena might be privileged
under the fifth amendment. See infa note 63. Federal immunity law therefore covered compelled "information" as well as testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976).
New York has two major variations from federal law. (1) Immunity is conferred on
grand jury witnesses not by court order but by operation of law. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW
§ 190.40(2) (McKinney 1971). (2) Immunity is not testimonial but prosecutorial or transactional, i.e., the witness cannot be prosecuted for matters he testifies about. Id. § 50.10(1)
(McKinney 1981). On state immunity provisions, see generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8,
§ 143, at 306-08. Jurisdictions granting prosecutorial immunity apparently must also afford
the witness testimonial (use and derivative use) immunity. See Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 53, 79 (1964). The utility of testimonial immunity to a witness who
possesses prosecutorial immunity is apparent in instances where for example, he is later prosecuted for a crime not the subject of his immunized testimony. Cf Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 627 (1896) (Shiras, J., dissenting) (arguing that prosecutorial immunity is unconstitutional because disclosures compelled in one proceeding may give clues and hints which may
be subsequently used against the witness in another proceeding).
19 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
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Court affirmed a reversal of his conviction. 20 Justice Stewart, writing
for the Court, simply quoted Kastigar v. United States, the Court's 1972
decision upholding the constitutionality of testimonial immunity: "[immunity] prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled
testimony in any respect .... ,,21
In UnitedStates v. Apfelbaum,22 decided the term after Portash, a witness had testified under immunity before a federal grand jury, and was
then indicted for committing perjury in the course of that testimony.
The trial court permitted the prosecutor to introduce portions of the
grand jury testimony that were not charged as perjurious to show that
Apfelbaum had made the indicted false statements knowingly. 23 The
third circuit reversed Apfelbaum's conviction, holding that the only immunized testimony admissible under the perjury exception to immunity
24
is the testimony alleged to be the corpus delicti of the indicted perjury.
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist rejected the notion that immunity requires treating a witness as if

he had been allowed to remain silent. 25 Silence is merely the mechanics
of the privilege against self-incrimination, not the protection the privi20 Id., afg 151 N.J. Super. 200, 376 A.2d 950 (App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 597,
384 A.2d 827 (1978).
21 440 U.S. at 458 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,453 (1972)) (emphasis

in original).
The Court first rejected the contention that Portash could not invoke his privilege because he had not testified and exposed himself to impeachment in fact. Id. at 453-56. It also
found that the judgment below did not rest on a state ground. Id. at 453 n.3. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, joined the Court's opinion and discussed the question of
independent state grounds barring Supreme Court review of the case. Id. at 460. Justice
Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, also joined the Court's opinion, and discussed whether
Portash had properly invoked his privilege. Id. at 462. Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief
Justice Burger, dissented on the ground that the Court was deciding an abstract question. Id.
at 463.
22 445 U.S. 115 (1980).
23 Id. at 119. The Supreme Court said the testimony had also been offered to put the
charged statements in context, and implied that the testimony had not been admitted on this
ground. Id. The record, however, shows that the nonindicted testimony was offered only to
show its own falsity in order to prove a pattern or design of perjury and to show a motive for
perjury as well as Apfelbaum's knowledge of the falsity of his indicted testimony. Appendix
at 23, 25, United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980). The trial judge did not state the
grounds upon which he admitted the testimony. Id. at 26. During argument on admissibility, however, he did state that, concerning the question whether the witness knowingly lied,
"you ought to be able to show other instances of false statements." Id. at 25. During a hearing on a post-trial motion the judge indicated that he had admitted the testimony to show a
pattern of deceit. Id. at 72. See also infra note 24.
24 584 F.2d 1264 (3d Cir. 1978), reo'd, 445 U.S. 115 (1980). The court of appeals also held
that immunized testimony could be admitted to show the context of the indicted testimony.
Id. at 1270 n.9. The Supreme Court did not advert to this portion of the holding. 445 U.S. at
119, 123-24; see supra, n. 23.
25 The Court first held that Congress intended the perjury exception to the statutory immunity to be as broad as the Constitution permits. 445 U.S. at 121-23.
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lege was created to afford.2 6 In fact, Justice Rehnquist reasoned, a perjury prosecution itself is inconsistent with the notion of treating the
immunized witness as if he had remained silent.2 7 The Court viewed
the privilege as protecting the witness only with respect to matters that
pose real and substantial hazards of subjecting him to criminal liability
at the time he asserts the privilege. When Apfelbaum had been granted
immunity, the chance that he might thereafter commit perjury was trifling and imaginary. 28 Hence, Apfelbaum could not have claimed his
privilege on the ground that he was about to commit perjury. Absent a
privilege there need not be immunity. Truthful 29 immunized testimony
30
may therefore be used in a prosecution for perjury.
How is immunity to be construed after Apfdebaum? Kastigar upheld
the constitutionality of testimonial immunity and stated that the immunity prohibits use of the compelled testimony in any respect. In Portash,
the Court, relying on Kastigar, prohibited a state from using immunized
testimony to impeach the witness. In Apfelbaum, the Court sympathized
with lower courts who had mistakenly read Kastzgar literally, but was
silent as to its own literal interpretation of Kastziar in Portash.3

'

The

Apfelbaum Court promulgated a test of isomorphism, a one-to-one correspondence test, for determining the scope of immunity: would the privilege against self-incrimination have been available to the witness on the
ground that the testimony he actually gave could not have been compelled? If the privilege would not have extended to the actual testimony, then immunity does not cover that testimony.
However closer Apfelbaum may be than Kastigar and Portash to a
principled doctrine of immunity, the decision raises serious problems
26 Id. at 124. In Kastigar, however, the Court had stated that the federal immunity statute
"leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if
the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 462 (1972).
27 445 U.S. at 126. Justice Rehnquist would have been more precise in stating that the
third circuit's admission of the corpus delicti testimony was inconsistent with treating the
witness as if he had remained silent. Since testimonial, not prosecutorial, immunity is involved, it is the admission of evidence, not the allowing of a prosecution, that is "inconsistent"
with treating the witness as if he had remained silent.
28 The Court based its analysis on the doctrine which excludes prospective crimes from
fifth amendment protection. 445 U.S. at 128-31;see infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
29 The Supreme Court assumed that the testimony in question was truthful. 445 U.S. at
123. But cf. supra note 23.
30 See infra note 34 for the separate opinions in Apfe/baum.
In a case decided between the Portash and Apfelbaun decisions, the Court faced the use of
immunized testimony to prove perjury by inconsistent statement. The case was decided without reaching that issue. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979).
31 Apffibaum discussed Portash only in a footnote, where it sympathized with lower court
difficulty in applying broad generalizations from the Court's immunity opinions. 445 U.S. at
120 n.6.
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and leaves application of the immunity concept uncertain. First, if the
Kastigar opinion is overbroad, what does that seminal decision stand for?
Second, if Porlash was decided on an overbroad premise, is the result in
Porash correct, and if it is, why? Portash limited immunity to "testimonial" use of the immunized testimony, 32 but neither defined "testimonial" nor attempted to show why impeachment is a "testimonial" use.
Third, both the statement of the Court's holding and its application to
the facts of Apfebaum are muddled. Justice Rehnquist wrote, "we hold
: * * the Fifth Amendment [does not require] that the admissibility of
immunized testimony be governed by any different rules than other testimony at a trial for making false statements. '33 The reach of this
"holding" is unclear. What result follows if the immunized testimony is
offered to prove perjury committed on an occasion prior to the grant of
immunity? Three justices in Apfelbaum felt constrained to concur in result only.3 4 Fourth, if, as Apfelbaum reasons, immunity does not extend
to perjury prosecutions because there is no privilege to commit perjury,
how can Portash be correct when it seemingly immunizes a witness from
exposure of his perjury by prohibiting impeachment based on inconsistent statements? Fifth, if Portash has not been overruled on its facts as
well as on its broad premise, does it follow from the premise of Apfelbaum-the symmetry of immunity and privilege-that Portash would
have had a privilege not to testify on the ground that his testimony
might some day impeach him?
It is clear that the Court cannot continue to decide the reach of
immunity as it did in Portash, by virtually unlimited generalization,
without considering the implications of Apfelbaum. If a given use of immunized testimony (e.g., impeachment) is prohibited by immunity, then
based on Apfelbaum that conclusion entails an implied holding that the
given use, impeachment, is a ground for invoking the privilege in the
first place. The Court simply cannot require symmetry between immunity and privilege without examining, in every immunity case, whether
the given use is a ground for invoking the privilege.
This Article accepts and will develop the Court's isomorphic theory
of immunity and privilege, and will show why Portash is nonetheless correct in result. A case for a broadened view of the privilege, partially
because of the availability of testimonial immunity, will be made. Apfelbaum will be shown to be incorrect in result. This Article will also ana32 440 U.S. at 458.
33 445 U.S. at 117; cf.id. at 130, 131 (similar statements).
34 Justice Brennan, and Justice Blackmun joined by Justice Marshall, both expressed reservations about the use of immunized testimony to help establish perjury not committed contemporaneously, and questioned whether special rules of evidence would have to limit the
particular uses of immunized testimony in a perjury prosecution. Id. at 132, 133.

1696

PETER L USHING

[Vol. 73

lyze the problem of immunized testimony and perjury by inconsistent
statement, a problem faced once by the Court but left unresolved. 35 Finally, this Article will discuss the constitutional requirements of an immunity statute, and consider an immunity case presently pending before
the Supreme Court, Pil/sbu Co. v. Conboy.36
II.

CONSTRUING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

As previously noted, a prosecutor can use immunity to make a witness testify despite the existence of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Since a grant of immunity obligates the witness to
testify rather than remain silent as the constitutional privilege would
otherwise allow him to do, it follows that immunity is itself required to a
certain degree by the Constitution when a privileged witness is forced to
speak. Hence, the Supreme Court has ruled that immunity must be
"co-extensive with the scope of the privilege. '3 7
In order to frame the immunity problem, this Article will initially
accept as a given the doctrine of the privilege against self-incrimination
that the Supreme Court has forged in cases not involving considerations
of immunity. The Court's jurisprudence of the reach of the privilege
emerges most clearly from cases in which witnesses initially claimed the
right to remain silent. These decisions delineate the scope of the privilege issue in its paradigmatic setting: does the witness have a privilege
not to answer the question? Cases on whether proferred immunity is
constitutionally sufficient to override the privilege, or whether previously conferred immunity bars a given use of testimony already given,
do not lend themselves to the construction of a theory of immunity from
the ground up; immunity has its origin in the privilege, not spontaneous
generation. Thus, the inquiry here will begin with cases dealing with
privilege, not immunity. In this section of the Article, the Court's "pure
privilege" cases will be the premise for the exploration of the privilege,
with a few passing exceptions identified in footnote.
The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any
person . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ....
,,38 Although the Court usually does not isolate the terms
of the privilege when it frames an issue regarding the scope of the privi35 See supra note 30.
36 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982), grantingcert. to In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,
661 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc). See infra text accompanying notes 143-50. The
Supreme Court rendered its decision in Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy as this Article went to press. 51
U.S.L.W. 4061 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983). See infa notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
37 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
38 U.S. CONST. amend. V. On the privilege generally, see M. BERGER, TAKING THE
FIWTH (1980), and the bibliography id at 265-71. For a comparatively lengthy Supreme
Court discussion of the history of the privilege, see Justice Goldberg's opinion in Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-77 (1964). On the policies of the privilege, see generally
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lege, consideration of each element of the text is useful. The Court tends
to use its own terminology for the elements of the privilege, such as "testimonial" for "witness,"3 9 and "incriminating" for "against." 40 The
substitute terms add nothing to explication of the privilege, but for
fluidity of prose they will occasionally be used here.
A.

"NOR SHALL" ANY PERSON

The self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment begins with
the prohibition "nor shall," implying that there are no exceptions to the
privilege. That there are no exceptions is not tautological, for the Court
has suggested that other privileges and rights created by the Constitution might have to give way under certain circumstances. 4 1 No language in the Court's self-incrimination opinions, however, indicates that
that privilege ever bends under the weight of competing interests.
B.

ANY "PERSON"

Although "person" of course includes natural individuals, it does
not include corporations or associations. 42 The exclusion is not based on
the ability to speak, however, since a self-incrimination question can
arise when documents are subpoened, 43 and a corporation is certainly
subject to subpoena. In fact, a corporation gives (written) testimony
when it answers an interrogatory. 44
C.

BE "COMPELLED"

"Compelled" traditionally meant forced to testify by the law of
subpoenas and contempt, and perhaps by other legal sanctions such as
preclusion for failure to comply with discovery requests. 4 5 The threat of
being imprisoned for refusing to testify truthfully is a compulsion which
triggers the privilege. The Court has additionally required that the
46
privilege be explicitly invoked before compulsion will be recognized.
Ayer, The Fifh Amendment and the Inference of Guillfrom Silence: Griffin v. California after Ft/.een
Years, 78 MICH. L. REv. 841,848-52 (1980); Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow.- The Case
for ConstitutionalChange, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 679-701 (1968).
39 E.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967).
40 Eg., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
41 See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391-93 (1979) (first amendment freedom); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (executive privilege). But cf. Hill,
Testimonial P1ivilege andFairTrial, 80 Colum L. Rev. 1173, 1180 (1980) (arguing against disallowance of executive privilege).
42 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
43 See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 374-75 (1911); infra note 63.
44 FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a). See Holler v. General Motors Corp., 3 F.R.D. 296, 298 (E.D.
Mo. 1944).
45 See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2266 (McNaughton rev. 1961); infra note 47.
46 United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943). Butcf. United Statesexrel Vajtauer
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"IN" ANY CRIMINAL CASE

"In" does not mean that compulsion triggers the privilege only
when it occurs during a person's criminal trial. The requisite compulsion can occur in any situation in which a witness is under subpoena or
other legal requirement to testify: grand jury, civil trial, legislative or
administrative hearing, pre-trial proceeding, or discovery.4 7 Thus, "in"
modifies the phrase "any criminal case," not the phrase "be compelled."
"In any criminal case" means that the witness is protected by the privilege in the face of a possible criminal prosecution, present or future, in
which he would be the defendant-not that the privilege exists only
'48
during the course of a "criminal case."
E.

ANY "CRIMINAL"

CASE

"Criminal" confines the privilege to hazards associated with the
prosecution of the witness for a crime. The privilege does not protect
against non-penal consequences such as disgrace, 49 loss of employment, 50 or betrayal of a trust. 5 1 The line between "criminal" and non"criminal" consequences is not always easy to draw. The Supreme
Court has recently affirmed that a given law does not create "criminal"
consequences if the legislature intended the consequences of violation of
52
the law to be civil, provided that the law is not too "punitive.1
Whether consequences are "punitive" is determined by a multiplicity of
53
factors.
v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927) (failure to invoke the privilege goes to its waiver);
supra note 8. On the unique status of criminal defendants on trial, see id.
It is debatable whether compulsion includes nonlegal coercion such as police brutality or
some lesser degree of overbearing behavior. The police have neither subpoena power nor a
privilege to assault suspects to obtain confessions, and although they do not necessarily violate
a law by cajoling or tricking a suspect, or by exhausting him through questioning, they certainly have no right to impose sanctions for not answering questions. Since, therefore, police
compulsion is not endorsed by law (as opposed to being "under color of law"), the Court
traditionally dealt with police irregularities principally under the due process clause, not the
privilege against self-incrimination. See Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 27-40 (1980). In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966), however, the Court wrote
that "all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by
law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." The Court has since retreated from
this position. See infra text accompanying notes 191-94.
47 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1967) (dictum); Comment, P/anti§as Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 158 (1981).
48 For more on "in," see infra note 102.
49 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598, 604-06, 609-10 (1896) (dictum) (immunity case).
50 Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956) (immunity case).
.51 Cf. Hale v Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66-67 (1906) (immunity case; impairment of reputation
for probity).
52 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
53 Id. at 249.
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TO BE A "WITNESS"

The Supreme Court first construed "witness" 54 in Holt v. United
States, decided in 1910.5 An issue at trial was whether Holt owned a
certain blouse; the government proved that he had put it on-under
protest-and that it had fit. Justice Holmes termed Holt's objections
based on the privilege "extravagant" and stated that "witness" concerns
"communications" of the compelled person, "not an exclusion of his
body as evidence"; otherwise, a jury could not even look at the
56
defendant.
The notion that a "witness" is one who "communicates" was reaffirmed in the 1966 case of Schmerberv. Califomia.57 There, the Court up-

held admission of the results of a blood test performed on an intoxicated
driver over his objection. Justice Brennan's majority opinion found the
values protected by the privilege to include the "inviolability of the
human personality," but concluded that historically the privilege had
been confined to verbal evidence. 58 The privilege reaches communications and responses, such as compliance with a subpoena duces tecum,
that "are also communications." 59 Lower courts had excluded from the
privilege fingerprinting, photographing, measuring, writing or speaking
for identification, appearing in court, standing, assuming a stance, walking, and gesturing. 6° "The distinction which has emerged," wrote Jus54 The word "witnesses" appears in the Constitution in article III, § 3, clause I (proof of
treason), and twice in the sixth amendment (rights of confrontation and compulsory process
in a criminal case). Since, in contrast to the use of "witness" in the privilege against selfincrimination, "witnesses" in these provisions does not refer to the person whose rights are
involved, nothing can be gained from examining their interpretation. See also infra note 58.
55 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
56 Id. at 252-53. The Court's reading of the privilege was technically dicta because it went
on to note that there was, in any event, no rule excluding illegally obtained evidence from
trial. Id. at 253 (citing Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), overniled, Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (federal trials) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (state
trials)).
57 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Seegenerally Arenella, Schmerberandthe PrivilegeAgainstSef-Incrimiatlion: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 31 (1982).

58 Id. at 762-63. The Court placed no significance on the constitutional choice of the term
"witness" instead of "evidence," which is used in some state constitutions, as in "no person

shall be compelled to give evidence against himself." Id. at 761-62 note 6.
59 Id. at 764. Some commentators have read Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886),
as standing against Schmerber, because Boyd protected seized papers not necessarily composed
by their custodian. See Dann, The FJ/hAmendment Privilege Against SelfIncrimination: Extorting
PhysicalEvidence fom a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 596, 605 (1970); Mansfield, The Albertson
Case: Confict Between the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination and the Govemment's Need for Informa-

tion, 1966 Sup. CT.REv. 103, 127. Boyd was cited in Schmerber regarding compliance with
subpoenas. 384 U.S. at 763-64. The Court has repudiated Boyd's theory concerning the interrelationship between the privilege and the fourth amendment. See Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976); Note, The Life
and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REv. 184, 206-11 (1977).
60 384 U.S. at 764.
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tice Brennan, "is that the privilege is a bar against compelling
'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a
suspect the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it. ' ' 61
Adopting this distinction, the Court held that by being the source of his
blood Schmerber had not communicated or implicated his "testimonial
capacities. '62 According to Schmerber, then, whether one is a "witness"
'63
turns on whether the evidence obtained is "testimonial.
The Court's most recent discussion of "witness" is in the context of
a court-ordered psychiatric examination to determine competency to
stand trial. In Estelle v. Smith,64 the psychiatrist appeared at a death
penalty sentencing proceeding to testify against the defendant. The
state argued that the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply
61 Id. The "lawyers' distinction" between real and verbal evidence had been rejected as a
touchstone for due process by Justice Frankfurter in the celebrated stomach-pumping case.
Rochen v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
62 384 U.S. at 765.
63 In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court appeared (in a rather confusing opinion by Justice White) to accept that situations exist where compliance with a subpoena duces tecum would involve being a "witness" because itwould reveal the actor's belief
about the documents he produced. Id. at 410. One who complies with a subpoena by tendering demanded documents does not, however, expressly assert anything. Perhaps the actor
makes an implied assertion ("these are the documents you demanded by description in the
subpoena").
Additionally, Byers v. California, 402 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring);
id. at 462-63 (Black, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting); id. at 472-73 (Brennan, Douglas,
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting), seems to construe the act of stopping one's car and giving one's
name and address, in the context of an accident and a hit-and-run statute, as "testimonial"
under the privilege because of what those acts reveal about the actor's belief that he has been
in an accident. Id. at 435, 436. Here the privilege encompasses conduct--stopping and giving one's name and address-although such conduct does not strongly tend to reveal any
incriminatory belief that is even impliedly being asserted by the actor.
Fisher examined earlier decisions which held that the actor was not a "witness" within
the privilege. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court had ruled that being
compelled to stand in a line-up wearing strips of tape and saying "put the money in the bag"
did not violate the privilege because the line-up extracted no "testimonial" evidence; it involved only compulsion to exhibit physical characteristics, not compulsion "to disclose any
knowledge." Id. at 222. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court had ruled
similarly regarding handwriting exemplars. Discussing these cases, the Fisher Court seemed to
exclude obvious, or so-called "self-evident," facts from the reach of "witness," as well as facts
already known to the Government. 425 U.S. at 411. Even if this exclusion from the privilege
were sensible, the evidentiary characteristics of obviousness and government preknowledge
relate to what kind of hazard triggers the privilege, see injra notes 84-118 and accompanying
text (discussion of "against"), not what metaphysical type of evidence-what is it to be a
"witness" or to be "testimonial"-comes within the privilege. If "witness" in the privilege
relates to the type of evidence-i.e., testimonial vs. non-testimonial, ideas vs. blood or physical appearance-then "witness" does not cover the question of how helpful the evidence is to
the government because of either "self-evident" characteristics or government preknowledge
of the compelled information. These characteristics relate to the hazard that the evidence
presents to the compelled person-a matter encompassed by the term "against" within the
privilege, as will be discussed in the next section.
64 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
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to what the defendant had told the psychiatrist because the defendant
had conveyed nontestimonial information. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, agreed that the privilege only covers evidence "related
to some communicative act. . .[or] used for the testimonial content of
what was said."' 65 In essence, however, the psychiatric diagnosis was not
based simply on observation of the defendant; the doctor relied largely
on the defendant's account of the crime and his lack of remorse, as well
as "remarks he omitted," such as, "[m]an I would do anything to have
that man back alive."'66 Hence, the defendant had been compelled to be
a "witness."
Estelle's reliance upon "omitted remarks" means that one can be a
"witness" within the privilege through silence, if silence reveals something of one's mind. This proposition may be a commonplace in the law
of evidence, 67 but in Estelle the revelation of the witness's mind was not
necessarily even a product of his consciousness. Further, the defendant
made no assertion, not even an implied one, unless one can construct a
68
statement from the very failure to speak under such circumstances.
In sum, the most consistent reading of the Supreme Court's holdings and discussions suggests that a "witness" within the text of the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is a person who reveals
the contents of his mind,69 regardless of the format of revelation. Those
matters which pertain to purely habitual characteristics, such as posture,
voice, or handwriting, or which are obvious, uncontroverted, or already
70
known to the government, are excepted.
65 Id. at 463.
66 Id. at 464-65 & n.9.
67 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 270.
68 In a footnote, the Court alluded to the question whether one is a "witness" if a psychiatrist relies on one's mannerisms, facial expressions, attention span, or speech patterns. 451
U.S. at 464 n.8. This Article discusses Estelle in another context, infla text accompanying
notes 98-102.
69 See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957); f Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (privilege protects a "private inner sanctum of individual feeling and
thought').
70 See supra note 63.
The relationship between "compelled" and "witness" in the text of the privilege-that is,
the meaning of the words "to be" in the phrase "compelled . . .to be a witness"--is quite
narrow under Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976). The Court there held that a
seizure of records did not violate the privilege since, inter alia, there had been no compulsion
to create the records. It follows that a compulsion to reveal facts to the government is not
sufficient to trigger the privilege, even if those facts originate in the mind of the compelled
person; there must also be compulsion to disgorge the content's of one's mind from the "inner
man" to the external world. In Andresen the only compulsion was one requiring the revelation
of facts which had already been disgorged from the mind onto paper. This analysis assumes
that submitting to a police seizure is "compulsion" within the privilege, although the Andresen
Court seems to reject that proposition. Id. at 473. In any event, language in the opinion
supports the above analysis of "to be." Id. at 473, 477. For the views of various commenta-
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"AGAINST" HIMSELF

It "witness" tells us what metaphysical type of evidence is protected
by the privilege, what impact must that evidence have upon the individual to be protected by the privilege? In what manner must the witness's
compelled revelations bear upon his criminal prosecution? These issues
are raised by interpretation of the term "against."
"Against" encompasses statements "leading to the infliction" of
criminal penalty. 71 More specifically, compelled testimony is privileged

if it could help bring about a conviction or enhance a sentence.7 2 Two
issues now arise. The first is qualitative: does "against" encompass any
causal connection between the testimony and the penalty of which the
witness is in danger, or does "against" cover only certain kinds of potential prosecutorial exploitation of the testimony? The second issue is
quantitative: how close does the causal connection have to be?-an issue since the privilege is passed upon when it is invoked, not when the
73
compelled testimony is ultimately used against the witness.
Several propositions, not entirely consistent, emerge, albeit murkily,
from the Court's evaluation of privileged hazards. First, there must be a
"real danger" of criminal penalty to the witness in answering the question, not merely a "remote possibility out of the ordinary course of the
law.' 74 Apprehension of the danger must be "reasonable."' 5 Substantively, then, the hazard must be fairly realistic. Second, the Court
tors on what "witness" means, see J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 2.04, at 22, 31-32
(1959) (voice exemplar could be privileged on a theory of "active cooperation'); E. MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 158 (1963); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 43, §§ 2263-65 & p. 396
n.8 (handwriting samples involve no facts absent a voucher that the handwriting is in the
actor's normal style).
One writer argues that "witness" should include conduct which can be so controlled as to
be used as a means of conveying ideas. Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars andthe
PrivilegeAgainst SelC-Incrimination, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 485, 506-08, & n.92 (1957). He excludes
writing exemplars because the state could not rely on the writer's veracity, due to the impossibility of imposing a sanction for not writing in one's normal style. The impossibility of a
sanction follows from a presumed lack of evidence that the exemplar was not "normal"-if
the state possessed such evidence it would not need the exemplar in the first place. Weintraub
admits it would be similarly impossible to prove that a witness lied about this crime, absent
proof of commission of the crime itself. Cf infia note 89. He also notes that the ability to
imitate another's handwriting is rare, but seems to overlook the comparative ease of disguising one's own handwriting, which would be a sensible strategem for a suspect. An interesting
and impassioned critique of the Supreme Court contends that one is a "witness" if one endures psychologically intrusive probing. Dann, supra note 59.
7t Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1956) (immunity case, quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886)).
72 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
73 See general. Comment, Self-Incrimination andthe Likelihood of Prosecution Test, 72 J. CRIM.
L. & C. 671 (1981).
74 Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913) (immunity case).
75 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951).
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weights the determination of the hazard strongly in favor of the claimant of the privilege. A judge must accept the witness's claim unless it is
"perfectly clear" that it lacks foundation. 76 The Court has spoken of
accepting the claim unless it is "impossible" or "incredible," 77 and has
even upheld a claim based upon the question, "What business is Mr.
Smith in?" 78 Procedural4y, therefore, the administration of the privilege is
strongly favorable to the witness, in keeping with the required liberal
construction of the privilege. 79 Third, the privilege has thus far been
recognized only where the evidence would either tend to prove guilt or
would lead to evidence that would tend to prove guilt, in the sense of
proof that the witness committed a criminal act.8 0 The Court has not
rejected fifth amendment privilege for testimony that would bear merely
upon matters unrelated to guilt, such as search and seizure; rather, the
question simply has not arisen in a claim-of-privilege case.8 ' Hence,
Portash, in extending immunity to testimony used for impeachment,
82
breaks new ground.
76 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951) (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881)).
77 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 198-99 n.18 (1955). Emipak quoted an "impossible-to-say-[the-witness-has-no-privilege]" "test" from Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71,
72 (1920). Arndstein, however, seemed only to be making a factual determination, not laying
down a rule: "It is impossible to say. . . the question could have been answered with impunity." Emspak also quoted a "not-incredible-[to-believe-the-witness-is-privileged]" "test" from
United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438,440 (3d Cir. 1952) (witness's suggested linkage to guilt
does "not seem incredible in the circumstances of the particular case"). Query: is the reference to "incredible" a mere comment on the facts in CoJfy and Emspak, or is it the application
of a standard? See generally Comment, supra note 73.
78 Singleton v. United States, 343 U.S. 944, revg per aeriam 193 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1952).
79 See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955).
80 The compelled evidence must "tend to show that [the witness] had committed a
crime." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). There must be an "incriminating tendency of the disclosure," Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 379 (1911), or a potential use
of the disclosure as a "supply [of] investigatory leads." Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 78 (1965). An "investigatory lead" could even be the name of a
witness who could supply evidence against the principal witness. Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951); ef infra note 82.
To be privileged the compelled evidence need not be enough to prove a prima facie case
of guilt or be a source of leads for a prima facie case; the privilege protects statements that
would merely furnish "a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute." Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (quoting Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161
(1950)); see Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 199 (1955) ("any one of many links').
81 The court's focus in claim-of-privilege cases upon hazards going to the merits of guilt, is
typified by Emrpak: "It is enough. . . that the trial court [passing upon the claim of privilege] be shown by argument how conceivably a prosecutor, building on the seemingly harmless answer, might proceed step by step to link the witness with some crime. .. ." Emspak v.
United States, 349 U.S. 190, 198 n.18 (1955) (quoting United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438,
440 (3d Cir. 1952)).
82 The framework for "against" laid out above-namely, hazards associated with evidence of guilt or evidence which could lead to evidence of guilt-does not entail that the only
hazards against which the privilege protects are those culminating (potentially) in the admis-
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One generic situation presents no hazard within the ambit of the
privilege. If the witness cannot be prosecuted for crimes he testifies
about because of a bar such as the statute of limitations, double jeopardy, or a pardon, then he has no privilege.83 A witness's innocence in
fact, however, does not mean that he faces no hazard; his testimony
might ensnare him in a prosecution through "ambiguous circum4
stances," and thus might still be privileged.
Quite troublesome to the Court are crimes not yet committed at the
time the privilege is claimed. Originally, the Court relied on Wigsion of evidence at trial--so-called "evidentiary uses." "Non-evidentiary uses" of compelled
testimony could include the decision to prosecute, see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,
52 (1968) (compelled disclosure could cause the prosecutor to "center attention" on the witness), plea-bargaining decisions, and formulation of trial strategy. See generall" Strachan, Se/fIncrimination,Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEX. L. REV. 791, 806-10 (1978). Given that a core
policy of the privilege is to require "the government in its contest with the individual to
shoulder the entire load," Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), the question of ends and means does not seem crucial here. If the witness's compelled testimony
would aid in his own downfall, whether by furnishing evidence or by helping the prosecutor
tactically, the Court should and would probably find the testimony privileged-at least so
long as the testimony was related to the merits of guilt. At the time the privilege is claimed
the distinction between evidentiary and non-evidentiary use could hardly arise, given the
difficulty of hypothesizing a potential non-evidentiary use that is not co-joined with a potential evidentiary use. The issue could arise after the fact: a claim of privilege is overruled, the
witness answers the question, the prosecutor exploits his answer only for non-evidentiary purposes, the witness is convicted as a result, and the claim of privilege is held on appeal to have
been erroneously denied. Under these circumstances, the appellate court must decide
whether non-evidentiary use of the erroneously compelled testimony is prejudicial error, or is
instead a windfall to the prosecutor which does not infringe self-incrimination rights. Alternatively, the issue could arise in connection with the facial constitutionality of a statute which
allowed non-evidentiary uses of immunized testimony.
An interesting case dealing with the non-evidentiary issue is United States v. Kurzer, 534
F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976). There, the immunized testimony may have caused another witness
to decide to cooperate and testify against the principal witness. The compelled testimony
thus may have ultimately led to evidence, although the connection between the compelled
testimony and the ultimate evidence, if any, was not logical but psychological. The court
held that the witness's immunity extended to use of the second witness's testimony if the
immunized testimony caused the second witness to decide to testify. The court did not discuss
the possibility that the witness's motive in deciding to "cooperate" and testify against Kurzer
may have been irrelevant, since it is the law of subpoenas, perjury, and immunity that causes
one to testify-it is not the person's decision to testify which causes him to testify. The witness's cooperation is irrelevant if it is the law that compels him to testify. One deciding to be
uncooperative would not be helpful to the prosecution, but would be committing a crime if
he did not truthfully testify under oath. His decision not to commit a crime would be irrelevant in this context since the self-incrimination clause does not protect one from the possibility that another witness will decide to obey law. (Note that in Kurzer the government knew
about the second witness without exploiting Kurzer's immunized testimony.) In Kurzer, however, the second witness was immune from grand jury questioning; he himself was under
indictment for matters related to Kurzer's crimes. See 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 111.1, at 321 (2d ed. 1982). Moreover, obtaining his immunized testimony would make it almost impossible for the government to proceed with his own
prosecution.
83 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598-99 (1896) (dictum) (immunity case).
84 Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956).
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more,8 5 flatly holding that the privilege protects only against disclosure
of past and "present"8' 6 crimes.8 7 This temporal dichotomy was discarded in Marchetti v. United States.88 Marchetti was prosecuted for failure to pay a gambling tax levied before he engaged in the gambling.
The Court upheld his defense of privilege, reasoning through Justice
Harlan that one can face "substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling
or imaginary, hazards of incrimination" even though the incrimination
pertains to a future crime. One who must register prospectively could
"reasonably expect" that registration would significantly enhance the
likelihood of prosecution for the future gambling and provide evidence
to facilitate conviction. Although witnesses might make insubstantial
claims of privilege based on prospective acts, noted Justice Harlan,
Marchetti's claim did not fall into this category. 89
The Court retreated from Justice Harlan's ringing rejection of a
rigid chronological distinction in United States v. Freed.90 Freed was
charged with possession of an unregistered firearm, and defended on the
ground that registration (the duty of his transferor) would have necessitated Freed furnishing his photograph and fingerprints for filing. Regis85 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2259(c) (3d ed. 1940).
86 A "present" crime would seem to entail a past crime that is a continuing offense, such
as possession of contraband or conspiracy. Hence "present" is a redundant category: unless
one commits a crime by the act of invoking the privilege, it is difficult to see what crime the
witness could be committing in the present that he has not committed before he invoked the
privilege, in the past. Cf United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 611 (1971) (concurring opinion) (self-incrimination; possession in future is a continuation of possession in present).
87 Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419, 422 (1955) and United States v. Kahriger, 345
U.S. 22, 32 (1953), both ovenmled, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
88 390 U.S. 39, 53-54 (1968).
89 Id. The Court stated that a rigid chronological distinction could lead to easy evasion of
the policies behind the privilege. The authorities cited by Justice Harlan for this proposition
are conclusory. See id at 53 n. 12 (citing Morgan, The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 34
MINN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1949) (characterizing Wigmore's view as an "utter absurdity" which
would "permit the destruction of the privilege in all or almost all situations by ingeniously
drawn legislation," but without explaining further); McKay, Self-Incrimnationand the New tivacy, 1967 Sup. Gr. REV. 193, 221 (Wigmore's notion is "naively artificial;" privilege "surely"
covers interrogation about future criminal plans)). One commentator has suggested that
under the Wigmore view the legislature could enact a statute requiring persons who commit
any crime to register prospectively. Note, RequiredInfonnationandthePrivilege Against Self-Incrimination, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 688-89 (1965). But would not proof that an individual had
violated the registration statute require proof that he committed the predicate crime? Cf.
supra note 70. The answer is yes, unless the registration statute covered mere intent to commit a crime, whether or not ultimately consummated. Such a statute, however, would give
the government an even greater problem of proof: proof of intent to commit an uncommitted
crime. The utility of the Wigmore doctrine is that it allows the federal government to obtain
information about and jurisdiction over crimes simply by enacting, as in the Marchetti line of
cases, a tax registration statute. But a non-prospective tax accomplishes the same end and
avoids the future crimes issue. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (taxation of
embezzlement income).
90 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
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tration was required prior to possession, which was illegal under local
law.9 1 Justice Douglas, for the majority, rejected Freed's self-incrimination defense, stating that there was no hazard of incrimination regarding
future crime because government policy was not to release the registration information. 92 Justice Douglas further wrote that the privilege does
not protect against "incrimination for a career of crime about to be
93
launched."
In Apfelbaum, the Court relied on Freed'ssecond ground of decision.
It distinguished Marchetti as involving a professional gambler who had
94
already gambled, was gambling, and was likely to continue gambling.
Apfelbaum, a perjurer, apparently did not fit this profile. The difficulty
with this reading of Marchetti is that is is unrelated to Justice Harlan's
reasoning in that case.95 Justice Harlan had emphasized a "confession
of guilty purpose" preceding the prospective crime. 96 A sensible reading
of Marchetti's facts and language--one that is consistent with the Court's
rejection of the case as determinative in Apfelbaum and which leaves
Freed's first alternative holding untrammeled-is that hazards in connection with crimes which might be committed after invocation of the
privilege are not grounds for claiming the privilege, unless the com97
pelled information would disclose an intent to commit such crimes.
The Court's most recent analysis of "against" within the privilege
occurs in Estelle v. Smith, the competency-to-stand-trial-examination case
discussed earlier in connection with "witness." 98 The state's psychiatrist,
having conducted a court-ordered competency examination, testified for
the prosecution at the defendant's sentencing. Chief Justice Burger
wrote for the majority that had the use of the examination been confined to determining competency to stand trial-a "neutral" purpose"no Fifth Amendment issue would have arisen." 99 Of interest is the
Court's view of the competency issue as "neutral," i.e., as not "against"
the person claiming the privilege. Since an incompetent person cannot
be convicted, it might seem that Chief Justice Burger's dictum is incorrect, for by helping to prove his own competency the defendant is furnishing an indispensable condition for his punishment. In support of his
91 Id. at 603 n.3, 604.
92 Id. at 606.
93 Id. at 606-07.
94 United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. at 129-30.
95 But see Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 660 (1976) ("basis" of Marchelli was that
disclosure was required only of gamblers).
96 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. at 53-54.
97 One could read Marchtili more narrowly, since, unlike the defendant in Apfe/baum,
Marchetti invoked the privilege as a defense to a charge of failing to furnish information, and
not as a shield to prevent use of testimony he had given.
98 451 U.S. 454 (1981); see supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
99 451 U.S. at 465, 467.
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proposition, the Chief Justice cited lower court cases which held that
one who raises the defense of insanity must submit to an examination by
the prosecutor's psychiatrist. 10 0 Hence, the Court might have assumed
that one who claims insanity or incompetency to stand trial has waived
his fifth amendment privilege not to speak to a government or courtappointed psychiatrist. 101

The defendant in Estelle, however, had not defended on incompetency or insanity grounds. Hence, waiver cannot account for the
Court's "neutral purpose" dictum. To determine if Chief Justice Burger
is correct, one should consider the possibilities once a compulsory competency examination has occurred. If the doctor testifies that defendant
is competent to stand trial, nothing sought has been lost by the defendant,
who, by hypothesis, did not "defend" on the ground of incompetency,
and did not attempt to disturb the assumption that a criminal defendant is competent. (One could logically maintain, of course, that the defendant has still been compelled to hurt himself, the assumption of
competency notwithstanding.) If the doctor testifies that defendant is
incompetent, such evidence tends to avoid conviction, and is not "against"
the witness. Although the evidence might cause incarceration in a
mental institution, the privilege protects only against "criminal"
consequences. 102
In sum, the most consistent reading of the Court's holdings and
discussions suggests that a person is a witness "against" himself within
the text of the privilege against self-incrimination when there is a nonremote chance that his testimony, by revealing information that helps to.
show commission of a crime, or by revealing information which could
lead to such information, would increase the likelihood of conviction or
100 451 U.S. at 465, 468.
101 Whether this waiver theory is sound is not a matter of the intrinsic reach of the privilege, but is a question of waiver and conditioning of constitutional rights, and is beyond the
scope of this article. See generally Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioninga ConstitutionalRight
on the Forfeitureof Another, 66 IowA L. REv. 741 (1981).
102 See supra text accompanying notes 49-53. See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-93

(1980) (due process protection from incarceration in a mental hospital). Arguably, commitment to a mental institution is a "criminal" consequence within the meaning of the fifth
amendment. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967) (juvenile delinquency proceedings are
"criminal" within the privilege despite the "civil" label the state attaches to the proceedings).
See generally Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Sef-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatic

Examinations?,26 STAN. L. REv. 55, 78-80 (1973); Note, Requiringa CriminalDefendant to Submit
to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against SefrInrimination, 83
HARV. L. REV. 648 (1970).
Another approach would be to reason that competency to stand trial is not an issue that
arises "in" a criminal case, as "in" is used in the text of the privilege. The argument would be
that competency is a matter of whether the defendant is subject to the criminal justice system;
competency is a transcendental issue, not a question that arises "in" a criminal case, i.e., goes
to matters of guilt or procedural defenses.
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enhancement of his sentence. With regard to crimes not yet committed
at the time of invocation of the privilege, the privilege exists only if the
compelled information would disclose an intention to commit such a
crime.
III.
A.

THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED IMMUNITY

THE ISOMORPHIC RELATIONSHIP OF IMMUNITY AND THE
PRIVILEGE

. The Court's Acceptance of Testimonial Immunity
The power to compel testimony over a valid claim of fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination by conferring immunity was
first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1892 in Counselman v.Hitchcock. 10 3 The statute examined in Counselman afforded immunity from
admission of the compelled testimony into evidence-"use immunity"but not immunity from a prosecutor following up investigatory leads
suggested by the testimony-"derivative use immunity."
The Counselman Court approved immunity in principle as a means
of supplanting the silence the privilege permits. According to the Court,
immunity must protect against that which the privilege protects against;
immunity is isomorphic with the privilege. The Counselman statute,
which provided use immunity but not derivative use immunity, was
held unconstitutional. The Court stated that only immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates would
be constitutionally sufficient. Immunity from prosecution"prosecutorial" or "transactional" immunity-was thus held to be the
104
only immunity which could eliminate the "perils."'
Subsequent immunity statutes did afford transactional immunity.01 Four years after Counselman, in Brown v. Walker, 10 6 the Court
upheld a transactional immunity statute, reasoning that a witness who
cannot be prosecuted for that about which he testifies can in no way
incriminate himself by testifying. 10 7 In 1972, the Court in Kastigar v.
United States' 08 read the Counselman requirement of transactional immu103 142 U.S. 547 (1892). For a discussion of the Court's principal immunity decisions, see
Mykkeltvedt, To Supplant the Fifth Amendment's Right Against Compulso i Self-Incrimination: The
Supreme Court and Federal Grants of Witness Immunity, 30 MERCER L. REV. 633, 636-53 (1979).
On immunity generally, see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-47 (1972), and authorities cited; Symposium, The Granting of Witness Immunity, 67 J. CRIM. L. & C. 129 (1976).
104 142 U.S. at 585-86.
105 See generally Note, Federal Immunity Statutes: Probiems and Proposals, 37 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1276 (1969).
106 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
107 Id. at 596-601. But see id. at 627 (dissent) (the testimony might be useful against the
witness in a prosecution for a crime about which he did not testify).
108 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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nity as a dictum because the statute held unconstitutional in that case
did not even afford derivative use (investigatory lead) immunity. If
Counselman's requirement of transactional immunity was a dictum, however, the constitutionality of the new federal immunity statute,10 9 which
afforded only testimonial immunity-use and derivative use-was an
open question. The Kastigar Court concluded that such immunity affords protection "coextensive with the privilege."' 10 The Constitution
did not require immunity broader than the protection afforded by the
privilege itself, which does not afford immunity from prosecution, but
only protection against being "'forced to give testimony leading to the
infliction of "penalties."' "III
For the Court, then, testimonial immunity is a constitutional
ground for compelling a privileged witness to answer questions. This
immunity is neither compensation for deprivation of the privilege nor
restitution of the benefit conferred upon the interrogator. Nor is immunity an injunction prohibiting the government from taking advantage of
destruction of the privilege. Instead, immunity removes the basis of the
privilege and thereby makes the privilege non-existent. This tour de
force is accomplished by tampering with the future so as to make legally
certain that the witness's words cannot be "against him in any criminal
case," thus dissolving the privilege. The privilege exists to protect the
witness against a future harm brought about by presently-compelled testimony; insuring that no harm can come about in the future removes the
foundation for invocation of the privilege.
2. Anal sis of Immunity in Terms of the Privilege
If immunity must remove the peril against which the privilege protects, no constitutional justification exists for extending immunity to a
use of compelled testimony if that use is not a danger within the ambit
of the privilege. 1 2 Just as the privilege does not protect against mere
invasion of privacy 1 3 or disgrace, 114 immunity need not prevent testimony from causing discomforting publicity through public release.
Again, as the privilege extends only to disclosure of the compelled per109 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976) (enacted 1970).

110 406 U.S. at 462.
111 Ia.

at 453 (quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) (quoting Boyd v.

United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886))).
112 Compare Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1913) (immunity statute construed not to apply where no incriminating testimony was in fact given) and Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16-20, 22 (1948) (immunity statute is not operative where the
compelled information was not privileged) with Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 152-53
(1949) (immunity statute is operative because the testimony was not solely exculpatory).
113 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood extraction).
114 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598, 605-06, 609-10 (1896) (dictum) (immunity case).
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son's thoughts, tI5a use of testimony that does not exploit these thoughts
need .not be accompanied by immunity.
This absence of immunity is constitutional even if the compelled
testimony tends to incriminate and therefore must be immunized
against those uses which do exploit the witness's thoughts. The Supreme
Court has recognized this dichotomy in stating that "the immunity
granted need only remove those sanctions which generate the fear justifying invocation of the privilege." ' 16 For example, assume that a witness is questioned about his participation in a bank robbery. He is
obviously privileged not to testify about his role in the robbery. He does7
not, however, have a privilege to decline to furnish a voice exemplar. "
If he invokes his privilege and is immunized, the immunity must protect
against use of the thoughts his testimony reveals, but not against use of
his voice as a means of identifying him. This bifurcation of compelled
testimony into privileged and unprivileged uses was apparently accepted by the Portash Court when it limited immunity to "testimonial"
uses of the testimony. 1 8 The compelled person is a "witness" within the
context of the privilege insofar as his testimony is used to prove his
guilt by exploiting the content of the testimony, but is not a "witness"
when his testimony is used simply to identify him by his voice
characteristics. 11 9
3.

The Ambiguous ConstitutionalStatus of Kastigar

In Kastigar, the Supreme Court's most complete statement on immunity thus far, Justice Powell wrote for the majority that a federal
statute which granted testimonial immunity prohibited the prosecutor
from using the compelled testimony in "any" respect. 20 From the opinion's context it is unclear whether Justice Powell was simply construing
the statute, which provided that "no" testimony compelled under an
immunity order could be "used against the witness in any criminal
case,"' 21 or was interpreting the fifth amendment self-incrimination
clause as well, since the statute had been challenged as unconstitutional.
If the Court was deciding the constitutional question, it read into the
115 See supra text accompanying notes 54-70.

116 Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956); see supra note 112.
117 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973).
118 440 U.S. at 459.
119 Another bifurcation of testimony into privileged and unprivileged exploitations revolves around the "against" term in the privilege. It is conceptually possible that a prosecutor
might wish to use damaging immunized testimony and yet not be proposing to use the testimony "against" the witness, as that word is construed in the privilege, because the testimony
was exculpatory when given. Cf supra note 112; infra note 122.
120 406 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
121 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976).
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fifth amendment an immunity from even non-"witness" exploitation of
the testimony (e.g., voice identification), and also from use of testimony
22
that was not "against" the witness in a fifth amendment sense.'
Despite Kastgar'sambiguity as a constitutional decision, the Portash
Court blithely quoted Kastigar in determining what immunity a state
must afford, stating that Kastigar made a "broad statement of the necessary constitutional scope of testimonial immunity."' 23 If, however, .Kastigar is deemed a constitutional case in its "broad statement"-prohibiting use of compelled testimony in "any" respect-then the Court
is committed to a total prohibition of any use (or at least "testimonial"
use,

as Portash held

24

)

of testimony

obtained

under

grant of

immunity. 125
4. Psychology and Symmetg in Kastigar and Portash
One can easily discern why the Court created a sweeping scope of
immunity in Kastigar, an immunity cut loose from its relationship to the
privilege against self-incrimination. Consider first the Court's perspective in the "pure privilege" cases, in which a witness refuses to answer
and is not offered immunity. Here, danger to the witness must appear,
or at least not be merely an absurd hypothesis. The Court applies this
standard for determining whether the privilege exists in a concrete setting-the question put to the witness is on the record, along with
122 Despite the use of fifth amendment terms in the immunity statute, it does not follow
that the statute is no broader than the constitutional privilege. "Witness" in the statute simply identifies the immunized person, whereas the privilege speaks of persons who are compelled to be a "witness." In short, while every immunized person is a "witness" within the
statute, not every person compelled to do something is a "witness" within the privilege. See
supra text accompanying notes 54-70.
"Against," as used in the statute, prohibits uses in the criminal proceeding after the
testimony is given, whereas "against" in the privilege applies to reasonably possible future
uses. A use "against" somebody at his trial might not have been reasonably predictable at the
time he invoked the privilege. See supra text accompanying notes 74-82.
Another issue regarding Kasligar's meaning is whether the Court intended to preclude
use of immunized testimony for non-evidentiary uses. Concerning evidentiary and non-evidentiary uses, see supra note 82. Justice Powell indicated that the statute provided "a sweeping proscription of any use" and a "total prohibition on use," while seeming to limit these
phrases to evidentiary uses, such as obtaining evidence through focusing on the witness because of his testimony. 406 U.S. at 460. Furthermore, the Court placed a burden on the
prosecutor to show affirmatively that an immunized witness is being prosecuted with evidence
derived from "legitimate independent sources," but said nothing about requiring the prosecutor to prove that he was not exploiting the immunized testimony in a non-evidentiary way.
Id.
123 440 U.S. at 458.
124 Id.
125 This prohibition ignores the traditional perjury exception to immunity which was in
the Kastigarstatute and is not now relevant.
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whatever facts might illuminate the danger the witness faces in
answering.
With this situation, contrast that in Kasigar: the witness has not
yet been questioned and is attacking the facial validity of the immunity
statute which requires that he speak, on the ground that the proferred
immunity is not sufficiently broad. A judge confronting a challenge to
an immunity statute is naturally inclined to think it equitable and convenient to rule that any use of the compelled testimony would be unconstitutional. 126 Intuitively, it seems unfair 127 to force the witness to speak,
yet leave open the possibility of prosecutorial exploitation of the testimony, especially if the litigants are not raising fine points about "witness" and non-"witness" uses.
The sweeping language in Kas/igar and Portash created, at least until Apfelbaum, a fundamental conceptual problem: if, as the Court states,
immunity is "commensurate" or "coextensive" with the privilege1 28 and
immunity prohibits any use of compelled testimony (as modified by
Portash's "testimonial" use), it must follow that a witness can invoke the
privilege based on potential use of his testimony against him, even
though such use would not be a "witness" use or "against" him as those
terms are used in the fifth amendment. Like a law of commutativity
holding that if A equals B then B equals A, 129 the Kastigar-Portashdoctrine that immunity is as broad as the privilege implies that the privilege
is as broad as immunity. The statement of the content of immunity is,
however, broader than the Court's previous statements on the content of
the privilege. This logic allows a witness to cite Portash's result and
claim the privilege because he fears supplying impeachment material for
some future prosecution, a situation not necessarily absurd, but certainly
not addressed when Portash extended immunity to impeachment uses.
As in Kas/zgar, the Porash Court saw an "obvious unfairness" in betraying the grant of immunity, without considering the consequences of
its holding for future claims of privilege. Kas/igar and Porash demonstrate that the act of compelling a witness through a grant of immunity
often makes it difficult to concentrate on the nuances of the privilege.
126 Previously, in another case where a pre-testimony challenge to an immunity statute was
mounted, the Court had stated that states must offer testimonial immunity against federal use
of both immunized testimony and the "fruits" of the testimony "in any manner." Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964). The term "fruits" derives from fourth amendment jurisprudence. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (per Frankfurter,
J.) ("fruit of the poisonous tree").
127 This assumes that the privilege can be said to be part of one's intuition. But see S.
SALTLBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 368-71 (1980) (arguments against every reason given for fifth amendment privilege).

128 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
129 See 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 60 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
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5. An Obvious Rationaliationof Portash Rejected
The obvious escape from the Kastigar-Portashparadox is to say that
immunity does prohibit any use, but only in cases in which there is a
traditionally recognized ground for invoking the privilege. The Kastigar
Court rightly assumed that Kastigar had a valid claim of privilege, since
it was the prosecutor's sole duty to determine whether immunity should
be conferred.1 30 Under this analysis broad immunity can not be said to
entail expanded ground for claiming the privilege. Similarly, in .Portash,
the witness presumably had a traditional ground for invoking the privilege. Hence, under this formulation immunizing impeachment uses
would not entail a holding that impeachment is a ground for invoking
the privilege.
Difficulties exist with the integrity of this rationalization. Compare
these situations: Witness Smith claims the privilege because his testimony would admit a crime, and he receives immunity (even from use of
his testimony to impeach him) should he testify in -his defense in an
unrelated criminal case. Witness Jones has been under suspicion for a
bank robbery; he fears answering even questions unrelated to the robbery because his answers may supply impeachment material useable
against him if he goes on trial for the robbery (impeachment by inconsistent statement or by prior non-criminal acts adversely reflecting on
his character for truthfulness).13 1 Smith's privilege is upheld, and he
receives a possible windfall immunity-immunity from a use which
might not have grounded a claim of privilege standing by itself. Jones'
claim of privilege is denied, and he is forced to furnish the prosecutor
with impeachment ammunition which might eliminate him as a witness
in his own defense some day, no minor consequence in a criminal case.
Reliance on traditional grounds of privilege has led to broad immunity
for Smith and to unequal treatment of two witnesses who faced the same
hazard by testifying: furnishing impeachment material.
6

An Unlimited Privilege Rejected

Can limitless expansion of the privilege cut the Gordian knot of this
problem? A plausible argument exists that, regardless of the facts, anyone should be allowed to claim the privilege against self-incrimination,
given the post-Bill of Rights developments in the law of immunity. The
government can always obtain a privileged witness's testimony by conferring testimonial immunity. On the other hand, granting such immu130 See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
131 FED. R. EVID. 608(b) ("instances of conduct. . . probative of untruthfulness"). Extrinsic evidence-the testimony--cannot be used, but the testimony could supply a lead for crossexamination. Id.
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nity is said to preclude the government from prosecuting the witness,
since the prosecution's burden of proving non-exploitation of immunized testimony is considered onerous. 132 This point is suspect, however,
because the statistics cited to support it concern prosecution of witnesses
for crimes which their testimony disclosed.133 These witnesses had a
traditional ground of privilege; thus, expanding the privilege would not
have impact on their cases. Further, nothing is wrong with the government's inability to prosecute witnesses for the very crimes their compelled testimony disclosed; where the government contemplates
prosecution for certain crimes, forgoing questions about those crimes
would not be burdensome. New York, for example, still grants automatic transactional immunity to all grand jury witnesses. 134
Concerning witnesses whose testimony would not disclose a crime,
the third circuit has recently ruled that "lack of relationship between
compelled testimony and a later prosecution may aid [the prosecutor] in
proving the absence of indirect use" of the testimony. 135 In other words,
the witness's testimony and the prosecutor's burden of proving non-exploitation of that testimony are interrelated: as the incriminating nature of the testimony decreases, the prosecutor's burden also lightens.
Expanding the privilege should hardly increase the prosecutor's burden,
since the less substantial the ground of the privilege measured in traditional terms, the less likely the government could ultimately find the
ensuing testimony useful against the witness-and this would be determined at the pre-trial "taint" hearing.
One also doubts that the number of claimants of the privilege
would increase if the privilege's scope were made unlimited. Persons
actually invoking the privilege despite a lack of incrimination would be
132 See Thornburgh, Reconciling Efective FederalProsecutionand the Fifth Amendment: "Crminal
Coddling," "The New Torture"or "A RationalAccomodation?", 67 J. CRIM L. & C. 155, 161-62
(1976); cf United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1077 (1981) (difficulties of avoiding tainting prosecutor's case with immunized testimony).
But see Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 169 (1974) (minimal
inconvenience to prosecutor); cf. Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Grantedto
Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1266, 1273-79 (1978) (in many situations the burden on
prosecutor to prove absence of taint will not be insurmountable).
133 See Flanagan, CompelledImmunity for Defense Witnesses: Hidden Costs and Questions, 56 NoTRE DAME LAW. 447, 456-63 (1981); Mykkeltvedt, supra note 103, at 656, 658-59 (in seven
year period in the 1970's the Attorney General received only three requests to prosecute immunized witnesses, prosecuting only one such witness; these statistics concern prosecutions for
crimes disclosed by the immunized testimony); Mykkeltvedt, Ratio Decidendi or Obiter Dicta?"
The Supreme Court and Modes of Precedent Transformation, 15 GA. L. REv. 311, 336-39 (1981);
Note, Federal Witness Immunity Problems and Practicesunder 18 USC §§ 6002-6003, 14 AM. CR.
L. REV. 275, 282-86 (1976) (immunized witnesses are not prosecuted for crimes disclosed in
their testimony).
134 See supra note 18.
135 United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 721 (3d Cir. 1980).

1982]

TESTIMONIAL IMMUNITY

1715

those having reasons for not wanting to testify other than sheer laziness
or the universal desire not to "get involved." Because the privilege must
be claimed when a question is asked, 136 claimants would still have to go
down to the courthouse when subpoened. Those currently invoking the
privilege on what are insubstantial grounds probably do so anyway with
a fair degree of success. 137 Such individuals might lie if their claim is
overruled, and might still lie if granted immunity. Hence, a broadened
privilege would have no impact upon perjurers. Persons who are encouraged to testify truthfully by the laws of perjury and contempt would
138
still be subject to those laws if immunized.
Subsequent testimony from a witness who frivolously claimed an
unlimited privilege would, if useable, help to prosecute the witness, in
which case the witness did not "beat the system" in forcing a grant of
immunity. If, on the other hand, the testimony would not be helpful
against the witness, immunity will have cost the government nothing,
since proving non-exploitation of useless testimony should not be
difficult. 139
A privilege of unlimited scope, matching Kastigar's expansive definition of immunity, should not be allowed, because, in the case of defense witnesses, exculpatory testimony may be lost by honoring a claim
14
of privilege. Since defense counsel cannot have witnesses immunized, 0
expansion of the privilege would cause severe prejudice to some criminal
defendants. 4 1 At least some people who would claim an insubstantial
privilege nonetheless would testify truthfully if their claim were overruled. Thus, an expanded privilege against self-incrimination, at least
theoretically, could cost a number of innocent defendants their
freeedom.
7

The Breadth of Constitutionaly RequiredImmunity

The privilege should not be expanded merely to accomodate Kasligar's twin demands of broad immunity and a commensurateness of immunity and privilege. Kastigar's sweeping language (immunized
Se supra text accompanying note 8.
Recall that administration of the privilege is heavily weighted in favor of the witness.
S supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
138 See infia text accompanying notes 202-46.
139 One should not automatically think of conferral of testimonial immunity as an event of
great magnitude. The Supreme Court has held that states have the power to confer testimonial immunity binding on the federal government. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 79 (1964).
140 ¢See
suzra note 12.
141 Cf Hill, TestimonialPrtvilege and Fair Trial, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1173 (1980) (expressing
skepticism regarding defendant's entitlement to a remedy for losing a privileged witness's
testimony). Given the realities of reluctant witnesses, less prejudice may occur than one
might expect.
136
137
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testimony cannot be used in "any respect") should be construed as mere
statutory interpretation despite the Portash Court's reliance on it in a
state case. Kastigar read earlier "constitutional" language in Counselman
v. Hitchcock as dicta in light of the narrow immunity statute at issue in
that earlier case, and therefore held that transactional immunity was
not required by the Constitution. 42 Reading Kastigar's references to
constitutional requirements as dicta in light of the broad immunity statute passed upon there, will similarly return immunity to its privilege
roots.
Since the constitutional purpose of immunity is only to remove the
perils which the privilege guards against, constitutionally required immunity is no broader than what one is willing to read the privilege as
covering. Whether immunity must extend to matters that the Court has
not yet considered as bases for invoking the privilege can be answered
only by determining whether such matters would indeed form a basis for
the privilege. Immunity cannot be expanded simply because the witness
had a recognized ground of privilege; such expansion is lawless, given
that the Constitution requires immunity only from the dangers against
which the privilege protects. Surely, immunity cannot be constitutionally required merely because, as a matter of mechanics, it was in fact
conferred upon a witness; this would be constitutionalization of a
windfall.
8. Application of somorphism: Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy
A case awaiting decision by the Supreme Court will serve to illustrate the isomorphic approach to solution of problems concerning the
scope of immunity. In Pillsbuy Co. v. Conboy' 4 3 (known below as In re
CorrugatedContainerAntitrust Litigation) Conboy testified under a grant of
immunity before a federal grand jury investigating price fixing. After
completion of the resulting criminal prosecutions, civil actions were
brought, and plaintiffs subpoened Conboy for his deposition. Plaintiffs,
44
having somehow obtained a copy of Conboy's grand jury testimony,
attempted to question him on it. Conboy, however, invoked his privilege. The district court overruled the claim and ordered Conboy to tes1 45
tify; he refused and was held in civil contempt.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
143 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982), granting cert. to In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,
661 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The Supreme Court rendered its decision in Pillsug
Co. v.Conboy as this Article went to press. 51 U.S.L.W. 4061 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983). See infra
notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
144 The record does not show how plaintiffs obtained the grand jury transcript, but they
may have done so by court order. 661 F.2d at 1147 n.1.
145 In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, MDL 310 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 1981),
afd, 655 F.2d 748, rev'd, 661 F.2d 1145 (1981) (en banc). In Conboy, numerous civil antitrust
suits were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation and assigned to
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected
the district court's conclusion that Conboy faced no possibility of prosecution, finding that federal conspiracy and state antitrust prosecutions
were not time-barred. Hence, Conboy had made a sufficient initial
showing of the potential for prosecution to support a claim of self-incrimination. 46 The immunity issue was thus reached: did Conboy's
grand jury testimonial immunity extend to future civil disposition testimony, in which case he did not have a privilege? Note the reverse juxtaposition of the usual positions: the witness, who wished to remain silent
at the deposition, was taking the government's usual position that he
had no immunity under the circumstances, while the interrogator, who
was exploiting the immunized testimony by using it as a springboard for
deposition questions, was claiming that the witness did have immunity
for the answers he might now give.
The court of appeals found that Conboy had a privilege, and reversed the contempt order. It reasoned that Conboy was being forced to
give incriminating evidence not covered by the immunity grant because
the deposition testimony derived not from the immunized testimony,
but from the witness's "current, independent memory of events."' 47 This
analysis, however, avoids the essence of immunity-protection against
self-incrimination resulting from compelled testimony. The better question was: "Did Conboy have a privilege not to answer the grand jury
questions on the ground that his testimony might cause a future plaintiff
to ferret out incriminating evidence?" This formulation reflects the isomorphism between the danger now complained of (incriminating answers at a deposition) and the privilege possessed when the immunized
testimony was given (was the deposition foreseeable within the terms of
the privilege?). If one answers the question affirmatively, then the immunity must extend to anything the future plaintiff could obtain from
Conboy. In that event, Conboy, being immunized from use of his civil
deposition, would not at the time of the deposition have a privilege to
refuse to answer, just as a person who cannot be prosecuted for the
48
crimes to which he testifies has no privilege.
During the pendency of a criminal antitrust investigation civil actions are usually imminent. If it is reasonably possible ("non-remote"'149) that a civil plaintiff will be able to obtain and exploit the
Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr., of the Southern District of Texas. Conboy subsequently
appeared before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant
to a subpoena. 655 F.2d at 750.
146 661 F.2d at 1151-53. The en banc decision on rehearing reversed the original disposition of the appeal, which had affirmed the district court's holding. See 655 F.2d 748.
147 Id. at 1155 (emphasis in original).
148 See sufira text accompanying note 83.
149 See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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grand jury testimony of the immunized witness, a reasonable possibility
exists that the transcript will be useful to that plaintiff and lead to selfincrimination by the witness, since the witness's deposition testimony
can easily become available to a prosecutor. Hence, if grand jury testimony is likely to become available to civil litigants, the grand jury witness at the time of his interrogation faces a danger from a future civil
deposition. He therefore has a privilege to refuse to answer in order to
avoid that danger, and hence must be immunized against that danger.
Under this analysis, a witness presumably would not be able to waive
his privilege in the grand jury insofar as future depositions are concerned; otherwise, such a strategem would allow him to avoid the extension of immunity to the depositions, thereby preserving his privilege at
those depositions.
This analysis is a simple chain of reasonably foreseeable events, a
notion akin to that of proximate cause. The seventh circuit's approach
relies on a purely conclusory premise that the deposition would not be
derived from the deposition questions, which concededly derived from
the immunized testimony. Whether one thing derives from a given earlier thing is not, however, a matter of conclusion but one of logic and
policy. Certainly, under a "but for" analysis Conboy's deposition testimony is caused by his grand jury testimony. As a matter of policy, the
liberal reach of the privilege, as well as a desire to make immunity effective and immunized witnesses therefore forthcoming and candid, argues
150
for liberal immunity.
150 An interesting fallacy in the seventh circuit's opinion is its notion that the district
court's decision that Conboy had immunity was an unauthorized judicial grant of immunity.
The court of appeals reasoned that courts cannot grant immunity on their own motion, and
that the district court, by forcing Conboy to testify, insured that his testimony would be
unuseable-and therefore immunized--because Conboy's fifth amendment privilege would
be improperly overriden. This was said to amount to "de facto immunity," improper even if
the district court were correct in concluding that the grand jury immunity reached the deposition testimony. 661 F.2d at 1156. The court of appeals said "the critical feature of de facto
immunity is that it occurs even when a court's analysis is 'correct,'" id., without explaining
why. If the district court correctly construed the scope of immunity, it merely applied a preexisting immunity, and did not create a new one. The district court's possible error in its
application of the law of immunity is hardly a reason not to decide the matter, or to fashion a
rule that a judge may never pass upon the scope of pre-existing immunity when a witness
invokes the fifth amendment. Someone must decide these matters. The court of appeals
feared that the district judge was simply "predicting that in a future criminal prosecution of
Conboy, another court will agree with the district court's determination that the deposition
testimony should be excluded." Id. at 1157. The district court, however, no more engaged in
prediction than any court subject to appellate review when making a decision. It must decide
the case, and if legal method involves predicting what another court will do, that is hardly
unrespectable. A fortiori, since the district court was not subject to appellate review by a
future criminal court prediction does not seem to enter into the matter. The court of appeals
was troubled by the government's absence as a party, evidently because the government
would therefore not be collaterally estopped by the district court's finding. Id. But the rules
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NON-MERITS USES OF IMMUNIZED TESTIMONY

.

Portash is not a Ruling on Inefctiveness of Limiting Instructions

A witness's prior inconsistent statement is offered for impeachment
purposes when it is used to cast doubt upon the witness's credibility.
This occurs by demonstrating that the witness previously said something
different from his present testimony, and therefore is not a reliable relater of facts. 151 If the witness is the defendant, the hearsay rule does not
bar such earlier statements from also being used to prove the truth of the
assertions contained in the statements, because statements of an adversary party are outside the bar of the hearsay rule. I5 2 If, however, the
statement was immunized, the immunity doctrine obviously prevents
the prosecution from using it for its truth value against the witness in a
criminal case.
Yet immunity is not violated ipso facto by use of immunized testimony to impeach a criminal defendant-witness. The jury can be instructed to use the immunized testimony only to cast doubt upon the
of compulsory joinder should have resolved this problem. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19. In any
event, a prosecutor would have no apparent way to use Conboy's grand jury or deposition
testimony. If the immunity extends to the deposition, then by definition it cannot be used. If
it does not, then Conboy had a valid claim of privilege, albeit erroneously overruled, and
future courts could belatedly enforce the privilege without disrupting the legal process. But
see 661 F.2d at 1157 ("dilemma"). In fairness to the seventh circuit, one should note that that
court saw probable admissibility of the grand jury testimony at the civil trial, so plaintiff
would not be hurt by allowing Conboy to invoke the fifth. Id. at 1158-59.
In Note, Prospective Detenninationsof Derived Use in Civil Proceedings: Upsetting the Immunity
Balance, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 989 (1982), the author supports the seventh circuit on several
grounds: (1) The witness can be protected by his invocation of the fifth amendment, and
hence does not need a determination of scope of immunity. Yet such reasoning gives no
weight to plaintiff's interest in obtaining the witness's testimony. (2) Only at a criminal trial
of the witness can the witness raise immunity as a bar. This, however, overlooks the fact that
it is not the witness who is claiming that immunity exists, but rather his interrogator. (3) By
determining immunity, the civil court hamstrings the prosecutor, who may have purposely
limited his grand jury interrogation of the witness to matters not covered in the subsequent
civil deposition; the "hamstringing" results from the enormous increase in the prosecutor's
burden to disprove taint in any subsequent prosecution of the witness. This, however, overlooks the witness's privilege not to answer, even if he does not have immunity, because he is
invoking the fifth amendment. The witness has either the fifth amendment privilege or immunity, irrespective of what the civil court believes. An erroneous expansion of immunity by
the civil court simply means an erroneous overruling of the witness's present claim of privilege. The prosecutor should realize this, and should not attempt to use the deposition testimony, since the witness obviously did not have to answer, either because of present privilege
or prior immunity (unless, of course, there was no immunity and the answer would not tend
to incriminate the witness, an unlikely possibility given the context of the civil antitrust
litigation). (4) If a later criminal court disagrees with the civil court, and rejects its determination of immunity, the witness will have waived his privilege by giving the deposition. Yet
this scenario is impossible, because the deposition will have been given under court order and
would therefore hardly constitute a "waiver."
151 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 34, at 68.
152 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
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oscillating witness's credibility and not to use the prior statement for its
truth value. Such a limiting instruction was impliedly upheld in Harris
v. New York,' 5 3 where a Miranda-violative statement was admitted for
impeachment purposes only. Although petitioner argued that the limiting instruction would not be obeyed by the jury, 154 the Court held that
the statement was admissible for impeachment. Jackson v. Denno 155 and
Bruton v. UnitedStates 156 hold that limiting instructions are insufficient to
prevent a jury from using evidence in a manner which would violate the
defendant's constitutional rights. These cases can be distinguished from
the later Harris decision on the ground that the evidence involved in
Jackson and Bruton was not admissible against the petitioners for any
purpose.

1 57

In Watkins v. Sowders, the most recent Supreme Court decision on
the constitutional effectiveness of limiting instructions, the Court found
that such instructions work, even when they might require the jury not
to use the evidence for any purpose, if the limiting instructions track a
juror's natural inclination to reject evidence as not probative. 5 8 Thus,
one must be careful to avoid making conclusions based upon the assumed fruitlessness of limiting instructions when analyzing the Portash
problem (use of immunized testimony to impeach). 159 Although one
could reasonably rationalize Portash as a case where limiting instructions
simply would not work, the Supreme Court, rightly or wrongly, has held
that jurors are able and willing to obey limiting instructions if the evidence is admissible for at least one purpose or is inadmissible because
not probative. In Portash the evidence could have been found admissible
for impeachment if a contrary holding had resulted, and in fact the
Court said nothing about effectiveness of limiting instructions.
153 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
154 Brief for Petitioner at 17, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
155 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (coerced confession).
156 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (co-defendant's confession).
157 Cf Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64 (1954) (trial judge "carefully" charged
jury to consider illegally seized evidence only on credibility issue; instructions upheld). But cf.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970) ("Bruton's refusal to regard limiting instructions
as capable of curing the error, suggests that there is little difference as far as the Constitution
is concerned between permitting prior inconsistent statements to be used only for impeachment purposes, and permitting them to be used for substantive purposes as well." Note, however, that here the Court was construing the confrontation clause, which pertains to witnesses
other than defendant himself; defendant would not have the opportunity to explain away the
prior inconsistent statement, since the witness in question is not himself).
158 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981).
159 But see Hoffman, The %vbilege Against Self-Incn'mination and Immunity Statutes: Permissible
Uses of Immunized Testimony, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 421, 446-48 (1980).
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2. Impeachment and the Privilege Against Sef-Incrimination
Does the privilege against self-incrimination require that immunity
extend to use of compelled testimony for impeachment? Under the isomorphic concept of immunity, the issue becomes whether the privilege
against self-incrimination would arise when compelled testimony would
be a hazard to the witness only through its potential use as impeachment material.
a.

"Witness"

First, it must be determined if one is a "witness" within the meaning of the privilege when one supplies inconsistent statement impeachment material. 60 Testimony which could be used to impeach in other
ways, such as testimony regarding conduct probative of untruthfulness, 161 would certainly be "witness" testimony since it is exploited for
its explicit factual content.
Inconsistency bears upon credibility because it'reveals either untruthfullness or vacillation and, hence, a capacity to err.162 At the time
the immunized testimony is given, neither untruthfulness nor vacillation
of belief is apparent; these traits become manifest only at the later trial
of the witness when he testifies inconsistently.163 The witness may not
have been untruthful when giving the immunized testimony-he may
have told the truth, or innocently misstated the facts. 64
Given that the jury is passing upon the witness's credibility at trial
when comparing his testimony with his earlier, immunized testimony,
the jury is obviously exploiting the earlier testimony insofar as the
speaker was a "witness" within the scope of the privilege. One's belief
can change between the time the immunized and trial testimonies were
given. The jury might nonetheless infer that the witness was untruthful
at trial, given the probable inculpatory nature of the earlier, immunized, testimony and the jury's doubt that the witness's belief as to hisguilt could have changed. The crucial fact is that the jury's inference of
untruthfulness may be caused by nothing more than a witness's mere
change of belief. If the witness did have a mere change of belief, his
160 See supfra text accompanying notes 54-70.

161 See supra note 131.
162 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 45, § 1017 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
163 Since "self-evident" matters are excluded from the privilege, supra note 63, arguably the
universal human trait of vacillation of belief is excluded from the privilege. This argument is
unpersuasive because, universal or not, to a jury the inference of the defendant-witness's incredibility is devastating, and not "self-evident."
164 If the immunized testimony were initially ruled to be insincere, it would undoubtedly
be useable for any purpose, as perjury is not protected by the privilege. Set in a text accompanying note 202-09.
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revelation of the contents of his mind at the time of his immunized testimony may be the cause of the jury's inference of untruthfulness and its
conclusion that he is not a credible trial witness. Contrast the case of the
witness whose compelled testimony is used to identify his voice: 1 65
whether or not he revealed his beliefs when he spoke, his voice nevertheless gives him away.
With impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, it is the revelation of belief that leads to the impeachment, whether the factfinder bases its conclusion on an inference of untruthfulness or a dubious capacity
to perceive, remember, or relate. A person is therefore a "witness"
within the scope of the privilege concerning his statements used to impeach him through inconsistency-Portash's "testimonial" use of the im1 66
munized testimony.
b.

"Against"

Is a person who gives testimony which can later be used to impeach
him by prior inconsistent statement or other method of impeachment
compelled to be a witness "against" himself within the meaning of the
privilege?167 There is little doubt that impeachment is a major
prosecutorial weapon, as demonstrated by the Court's heightened focus
in recent years on the subject of impeachment.1 68 A jury which finds
that a defendant has been impeached not only rejects his testimony, but
also has affirmative proof of guilt as well, since the witness's exculpatory
testimony has been shown to be untrue.169
Earlier it was shown that "against" has been construed to exclude
from the scope of the privilege dangers that are "remote possibilit[ies]
out of the ordinary course of the law."' 70 Yet the danger that a witness
is supplying impeachment material is hardly remote. One could argue
that a witness can control whether his present (compelled) and future
(trial) testimony will be inconsistent, and thus can avoid any danger of
supplying impeachment material. To say, however, that a person can
"control" whether he testifies at all at his trial is to diminish the consti165 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973).
166 See supra text accompanying note 124.

167 See supra text accompanying notes 71-102.
168 See Fletcher v. Weir, 102 S.Ct. 1309 (1982); Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980);
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States
v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971); see also United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93 & n.8 (1980); cf. United
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (use of illegally seized evidence to impeach).
169 Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J.) (dictum) (jury may
believe the opposite of disbelieved testimony), quoted with approval in NLRB v. Walton Mfg.
Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962) (per curiam).
170 See supra text accompanying note 74.
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tutional right to testify in one's own behalf.' 7 1 Moreover, the hazard of
inconsistency in one's trial testimony is not actually within one's control
since, as discussed above, inconsistency can arise from a change of belief.1 72 The changing of one's belief is not under one's control, as is rec-

ognized by the right of a witness to explain prior inconsistent
statements.1 73 Change of testimony can be perfectly innocent, caused
by improved or deteriorated memory, reflection, discussion or investigation, or simply the human tendency to relate events differently on different occasions.
To hold that one is a witness against himself when one furnishes
testimony that can possibly be used for impeachment would, of course,
make it possible for all witnesses to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination despite the fact that they are not being questioned about a
crime.1 74 Testimony not related to a crime could be exploited for purposes of inconsistent impeachment since an inconsistent statement need
not be material in order to be used for impeachment (unless the statement is proven by extrinsic evidence)1 75 A witness testifying on any
subject, no matter how unincriminating, could be questioned about the
same subject at his subsequent criminal trial, and thus face a chance of
innocent contradiction and self-discrediting. Alternatively, a witness
not being asked about a crime might be required to reveal conduct relevant to his character for untruthfulness and thereby threaten his credibility as a witness at a subsequent criminal trial. 176 Further, a witness's
testimony might reveal criminal conduct which, although covered by a
bar to prosecution, nevertheless is relevant to prove his poor character
for truthfulness; under these circumstances, revelation of the criminal
conduct would not furnish a traditional ground for the privilege1 77 but
would furnish a basis for impeachment.
3.

Toward a Broader Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

There is a way to protect those who are likely to furnish impeachment material, without expanding the privilege beyond reason. The key
171 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975) (dictum).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
173 FED. R. EvID. 613(b) (the right to explain is inapplicable to statements received as
admissions for their truth, but immunity would prevent admission for that purpose); 3A J.
WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 1044 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (witness's error may have been based
upon a "temporary misunderstanding").
174 Cf. United States v. Hockenberry, 474 F.2d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 1973) (use of immunized
testimony which admitted perjury, to show a pattern of deceit and thereby discredit the witness, is unconstitutional).
175 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 1023 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
176 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
177 See supra text accompanying note 83.
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to a reasonable privilege in the impeachment area is to require a reasonable danger of prosecution before the privilege attaches; everyone is
likely to contradict himself on occasion, but not everyone is reasonably
likely to set up a possible contradiction of himself while a defendant in a
criminal trial, since not everybody can reasonably anticipate being
prosecuted.
Criminal defendants, persons under investigation by law enforcement officials, and other persons who are suspected of crime should be
able to protect themselves against being made to furnish a prosecutor
with impeachment ammunition. Given the chance that a prosecutor
might show a contradiction by any defendant-witness who has previously testified, none of the persons in these categories should be compelled to testify. During the initial proceedings, they face a non-remote
hazard of injuring themselves in a later criminal prosecution, regardless
of what they are questioned about.
Under my interpretation of "against" within the text of the privilege, the privilege would accord with intuitive notions of unfairness in
allowing a prosecutor to interrogate people who are in jeopardy of prosecution, and would also protect against compulsory testimony in any
non-prosecutorial forum for those who face criminal litigation.
"Against" within the fifth amendment privilege should mean a non-remote chance of increasing the likelihood of conviction or enhancing a
sentence. "Non-remote" means that a prosecution is reasonably likely
because (1) the compelled testimony would be evidence of the witness's
past crime, is an investigatory lead for such evidence, or expresses an
intent to commit a crime; (2) the witness is a defendant in a criminal
case, is being investigated or interrogated by law enforcement officials,
or is suspected of crime by such officials; or (3) other circumstances
make prosecution of the witness substantially more likely than prosecution of a randomly selected person.
Under this proposed definition, the privilege is triggered (insofar as
the term "against" is concerned) not only by the nature of the testimony
(part (1))-as is the case in existing law (except for criminal defendants
on trial)-but also by the nature of the witness (parts (2) and (3)). It
follows from the definition that testimony which could some day be used
by a prosecutor to defeat procedural defenses, such as motions to suppress illegally seized evidence or to dismiss charges for failure to afford a
speedy trial, is also privileged, if the witness originally faced a reasonable hazard of prosecution. All forms of impeachment uses-indeed any
use of such a witness's testimony-would form a ground of privilege.
Prosecutors who nonetheless wished to obtain the testimony would have
to confer immunity. Under the principle of isomorphism, this immunity
would cover any use of the testimony that would exploit the immunized
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individual as a "witness" within the meaning of the privilege. The increase in the number of witnesses receiving immunity would not impede
prosecutors.1 78 Further, immunity would not be a license to commit
perjury, because, as shown below, perjurious testimony is not a "witnessing";1 79 hence, it is not privileged and need not be immunized.
As an expansion of the privilege, the proposed definition would
hamper some criminal defendants in obtaining evidence.1 80 This tradeoff is, however, necessary to protect those who realistically face self-incrimination. As previously discussed, expanding the privilege probably
would not significantly increase the number of witness who are "lost" to
1 81
criminal defendants.
.

Miranda- Violative Statements Indistinguishable

Is a case which determined the permissible use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda,1 82 a precedent for the constitutionally
required scope of immunity? The Portash opinion was largely concerned
with distinguishing cases that allowed Miranda-violative statements to be
used for impeachment. Is the distinction reasonable?
In Miranda, the Court "readily perceive[d] an intimate connection
between the privilege against self-incrimination and police custodial
questioning."' 183 "[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation. . . contains inherently compelling pressures which work
. . .to compel him to speak .... ,1184 Hence, Miranda held that before
custodial interrogation can proceed, the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause requires that the now well-known Miranda warnings be given
and that the interrogated individual be given an opportunity to exercise
the rights conveyed by the warnings.1 85 If the warnings were not given
or the rights not granted (unless waived), statements obtained through
custodial interrogation could not be "use[d].'

186

See supra text accompanying notes 132-39.
See infra notes 203-46 and accompanying text.
180 Civil litigants, who similarly have no power to confer immunity, might also be
hindered.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 13641.
182 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
183 Id. at 458; see supra note 46.
184 384 U.S. at 467.
185 The warnings are that the individual has the right to remain silent, that any statement
made may be used against him, and that he has a right to have an attorney present, either
retained or appointed. Id. at 444.
186 Id. The Supreme Court has not discussed whether, if a court determines that a confession was coerced or obtained in violation ofMiranda, there should be a Kastigar hearing, supra
text accompanying notes 16-17, at which the government should have to prove that its case is
not tainted by the illegally obtained confession. Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
46 1-62 (1972) (discussing suppression of fruits of coerced confession, but not discussing burden of proof on whether fruits taint prosecutor's case). But cf.Harrison v. United States, 392
178
179
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Nonetheless, in Hars v. New York,1 8 7 a decision vigorously criticized
on methodological grounds1 88 as well as on the merits, 89 the Court held
that statements obtained in violation of Miranda'sstrictures could nonetheless be used to impeach the interrogated suspect at his trial. Harris
thus stands for the proposition that statements obtained in violation of
the fifth amendment privilege are still admissible when used to impeach.
Harris harkened toward the use of immunized statements for impeachment, since immunity would not have to reach a hazard that the privilege does not protect against. 190
After Harris, however, the Court in Michigan v. Tucker revised Miranda by putting its fifth amendment foundation in doubt, holding that
failure to comply with Miranda is merely a failure to afford "procedural
safeguards" of the privilege against self-incrimination and is not a deprivation of the privilege itself. 19 The Court stated that the custodial interrogation in Tucker, even though not in conformity with Miranda, did
not involve "compulsion sufficient to breach the right against compulsory self-incrimination."' I9 2 Tucker in a sense had been presaged in Harris, where the Court noted that the Miranda-violative statements were
not claimed to be coerced or involuntary. 193 Since Tucker, the Court has
resumed its referrences to Miranda, perhaps reflexively, in a constitutional context.' 94 Whether Miranda warnings are constitutionally required, and how that decision can bind the states if the warnings are
U.S. 219, 225 n.12 (1968) (government has burden of proof that defendant's trial testimony
was not caused by the admission of his illegally obtained confession). Note that the requirement vel non of a hearing, with the burden of proof on the prosecutor, is a separate issue from
the substantive reach of the remedy of suppression, i.e., the decision whether to suppress a
given fruit of the illegality. Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (no suppression of
testimony of witness who was learned of because of Miranda-violative statements). See also
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (reluctance to suppress testimony of witness
who was found as a result of a fourth amendment violation). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)
(1976) (suppression of "evidence derived," as well as contents, of illegal wiretaps); Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 105, 183 (1969) (concession that government has burden of persuasion that its evidence is not tainted by illegal search).
187 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
188 Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v.New York: Some Anxious Observationson the Candorand Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
189 The Supreme Court 1970 Tenn, 85 HARv. L. REV. 40, 44-53 (1971).
190 See Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Ffth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61
MINN. L. REv. 383, 415 n.163 (1977); cf. Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 188, at 1223 & n.98
(reasoning that if immunized testimony is useable to impeach, then testimonial immunity
may be unconstitutional).
191 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974); see Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup.
CT.REV. 99, 118, 123.
192 417 U.S. at 445.
193 401 U.S. at 224.
194 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1981); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,
466 (1981); cf.Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 237-38 (1980) (reading Harris as a gloss on
the fifth amendment).
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not, are questions outside the scope of this Article. Of importance for
present purposes is that the Portash Court's distinction of Hamis is
unsound.
Portash read Hars as limited to statements which were not "coerced or involuntary."1 95 Harrisbalanced society's interest in preventing
perjury against the Miranda interest in deterring unlawful police conduct, and had favored the. anti-perjury side of the scale. The Portash
Court held that immunized testimony is "the essence of coerced testimony," and that in other cases the Court had held that "compelled"
testimony cannot be put to any "testimonial" use.19 6 The Portash Court
concluded that balancing is impermissible when dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination "in its most pristine form."' 97 Hence,
Portash's immunized testimony, by definition "compelled" in the "most
pristine" sense of the fifth amendment privilege, could not be used to
impeach him despite the permissible uses of Miranda-violative
statements.
Such reasoning, however, is mere semantics. Immunized testimony
hardly seems "coerced" as that term is normally used and was presumably used in Harris. Kastigar itself had contrasted coerced confessions
with immunized testimony. 9 8 "Coercion" suggests images of unreliable
confessions brought on by pressure to speak certain words or suffer immediate and serious penalties. 99 By contrast, an immunized witness
may not like the idea of having to speak, but to think that he might
falsely incriminate himself because he fears the alternative of instant reprisal or continuing penalties, is unrealistic. "Coercion" and "involuntary" are rife with connotations of unlawfulness and overbearing
behavior. Immunized testimony, which is authorized by statute, obtained under court order, and given in the presence of a judge or grand
jury, does not evoke such negative connotations. 200 Hamis explicitly saw
the untrustworthiness of immunized testimony as the key to its inadmissibility for impeachment; 20 1 untrustworthiness simply is not a character195 440 U.S. at 458-59. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 224; Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S.

at 722-23.
196 Portash, 440 U.S. at 458. The Court cited Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978),
which, as shown by its quotation in Poriash, spoke not of "testimonial" use of "compelled"
statements but of "any" use of "involuntary" statements. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459 (quoting
437 U.S. at 398 (emphasis in originals)). Mincey involved impeachment statements obtained
by the police from a suspect who was lying on the edge of consciousness in a hospital bed. 437

U.S. at 398.
197 440 U.S. at 459.
198 406 U.S. at 461-62.
199 See Y. KAMISAR, supra note 46, at 11-12.
200 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 470-71 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201 401 U.S. at 224.
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istic of immunized testimony, especially inculpatory immunized
testimony.
As for Portash's privilege in "its most pristine form," the notion that
there are differing qualitative degrees of the privilege is novel and was
unanalyzed in Portash; "pristine" was a deus ex verbun to lift the Court
from the Harris morass. If Miranda warnings derive from the fifth
amendment, the Court has not yet stated a distinction between Harris
and Portash. Nor can I offer one.
C.

PERJURY

I.

Generaly

The Supreme Court first took the position that the fifth amendment privilege does not sanction witness perjury in Glickstein v. United
States, decided in 1911.202 The Court reasoned that the government has
the power to compel testimony, and that such power must include the
right to obtain truthful testimony. Therefore, the privilege against selfincrimination relates only to past acts and does not license a witness to
203
commit perjury.
The Court has adhered to Glickstein's pronouncement that the privilege does not excuse perjury, insisting that the privilege creates a mechanism for silence, not false testimony.2 4 The Court is obviously correct:
while perjury does avoid that which a witness is privileged not to doself-incriminate-so would assault of one's interrogator. A witness's invocation of the privilege and ensuing silence (or truthful testimony
under immunity) accomplishes the same end and is less disruptive. No
one who understands the privilege will be misled by a witness's silence
following a claim of privilege, especially since inferences from a claim of
privilege are forbidden.20 5 Perjury on the other hand, disables the tribu-

nal which hears it.206
This reasoning demonstrates that a witness can be guilty of perjury
even though he was privileged not to speak. Grounds also exist for concluding that (1) the perjurious testimony of a privileged witness is not
privileged from use as evidence of the unprivileged crime of perjury, and
(2) the privilege is not triggered by the intention of the witness to per202 222 U.S. 139 (1911).
203 Id. at 142 (citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) and Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896), both of which upheld immunity statutes containing perjury exceptions
without, however, considering those exceptions).
204 United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977).
205 See generally Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt From Silence: Griffin v.
California After Ffleen Years, 78 MICH.L. REv. 841 (1980).
206 See generally Westen & Mandell, To Talk, To Bak, or To Lie: The EmergingFifh Amendment
Doctrineof the "Freferned Response," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521 (1982).
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jure himself. These propositions follow from the fact that a person who
commits perjury was not "compelled" under the privilege, because fifth
amendment compulsion is a legal requirement to testify truthfully. Further, the perjuror is not a "witness" under the fifth amendment because
his testimony does not reveal the contents of his mind.2 0 7 Moreover,
perjurious testimony is not "against" the witness under the fifth amendment; such testimony neither aids in the prosecution of crimes committed prior to the interrogation, nor facilitiates the prosecution of crimes
subsequent to interrogation through disclosure of intent to commitf the
20 8
future crime.
If a witness has no privilege to commit perjury or to have perjury
suppressed as evidence of itself, and if intent to commit perjury does not
trigger the privilege, then there need be no immunity against use of perjurious testimony under the isomorphic concept of immunity.2 0 9 Glickstein was therefore sound in reading a perjury exception into the
immunity statute applied in that case.2 10 Yet Glickstein is silent on the
Apfelbaum problems: (1) what immunized testimony, if any, is useable in
a prosecution for perjury, and (2) for what purposes may admissible immunized testimony be used in the witness's perjury prosecution? 21'
The second issue was raised in separate opinions in Apfelbaum, but
with no explanation of why it is a problem.2 12 Since there seems no
reason to surround the admissibility of useable immunized testimony
213
with particular hedges beyond those provided by the law of evidence,
I will turn exclusively to the first problem.
2. Non-Perjurious Testimony Given Before, During, and After Perjug and
Before and After Immunity is Conferred
Justice Rehnquist's statement of the Court's holding in Apftlbaum
was quite broad: the privilege does not govern admissibility of immu207 Perjury itself reveals an ability to speak and to understand English, and therefore a
capacity to commit the present or prior perjury, but these abilities are too obvious to be
protected by the privilege. See supra note 63.

208 See supra text accompanying notes 85-97.

209 See supra text accompanying notes 112-19.
210 See 222 U.S. at 143.

211 In Cameron v. United States, 231 U.S. 710 (1914), the defendant argued that his immunized testimony was admissible at his perjury trial only to show the fact that the perjurious
words were uttered, that is, to establish the corpus delicti. Id. at 718. The Court disagreed,
stating that the testimony-not characterized as either entirely or only partially perjuriouscould be used in a perjury prosecution for "any legitimate purpose in establishing the charge
made." Id. at 721. The Court also construed the immunity statute involved as forbidding the
testimony from being used to prove perjury committed on a different occasion. Id. at 723-24.
212 See supra note 34.
213 Cfisupra note 211.
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nized testimony "at a trial for making false statements. ' '1 4 If, however,
the perjured testimony was given prior to truthful testimony, there is no
reason why the witness does not have the usual privilege to refuse to
answer if his truthful answer would tend to show him guilty of perjuryeven perjury committed one question earlier. Here is the basic fallacy in
Apfelbaum: Justice Rehnquist saw the grant of immunity as a line of
temporal demarcation after which any perjury somehow voids the privilege, and hence the immunity, for all subsequent testimony, whether
perjurious or not. The Court errs in viewing the conferral of immunity
as a freeze of the witness's fifth amendment rights as of a given moment
in time. Actually, the privilege may arise any time a question is asked,
depending on what the truthful answer would be. The text of the privilege, not the text of an immunity statute, creates the privilege. The
compulsion to answer each question creates a discrete instance of privilege. That the witness has been immunized and hence forbidden to invoke his privilege are merely mechanical consequences imposed by the
immunity statute-he still has his privilege each time a question is
asked, whether or not the privilege is physically claimable at that moment. Ironically, Justice Rehnquist, who viewed silence as merely an
"effect" of the privilege and not a protection afforded by the privilege, 2 1 5 did not realize that the prohibition against invoking the privilege is merely an effect of immunity, not an actual nullification of the
21 6
privilege.
Once the immunized witness commits perjury--either before or after the grant of immunity-he may still thereafter be privileged, precisely because his truthful answer would tend to reveal or help prove
that perjury.2 1 7 If the reasoning of Apfelbaum were correct, then an immunized witness would be worse off than a non-immunized witness,
since only he could be compelled to "play detective" in uncovering his
own prior perjury.
Hence, testimony which would, through revelation of the contents
214 445 U.S. at 117; f id. at 130, 131 (similar statements).
215 Id. at 124.
216 Justice Rehnquist also flirted with a contract theory that seems entirely inappropriate.

He characterized immunity as a "bargain" and "exchange" between the witness and his interrogator; the witness's perjury excuses nonperformance of the contract by the government.
Id. at 130. The contract is elusive, though, when one considers that the witness asked not for
immunity, but for his privilege to remain silent, and had no power to decline the grant of
immunity which overrode that privilege. United States v. Kates, 419 F. Supp. 846, 858 n.25
(E.D. Pa. 1976). Moreover, the bargain theory fails to explain the Court's broad holding,
which does not distinguish perjury committed prior to the grant of immunity.
217 Similarly, a witness, when questioned regarding a subject about which he testified a
year earlier, may have a privilege not to reveal that his testimony on the prior occasion was
perjurious by giving a truthful answer that would discredit his earlier testimony. See United
denied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977).
States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 823 (2d Cir.), cert.
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of the witness's mind, aid the prosecutor in detecting or proving prior
perjury is clearly privileged and must be immunized, even in a perjury
prosecution and despite the fact the perjury was committed after the
grant of immunity. This approach is correct regarding answers which
tend to show either falsity or the witness's knowledge of his falsity.
Immunizing post-perjury testimony would not cause insurmountable practical problems for prosecutors who believe the truthful testimony is necessary to show the context of the perjurious testimony at the
perjury trial.2 18 Context will often appear from testimony given prior to
the perjury, and is hence unprivileged because evidence of a prospective
crimes does not fall within the privilege. If testimony given subsequent
to the perjury is -what makes the indicted testimony perjurious--e.g.,
"What I meant earlier was. . . ."--then the subsequent testimony can
be deemed part of the perjury itself since it is necessary to understand
earlier, perjurious testimony. Later testimony explicating earlier perjury is part of the perjury because the reasonably understood meaning of
the testimony is an element of perjury. 219 By explaining the earlier
testimony, the later testimony helps create the crime of perjury. The
privilege reaches only proof of a prior crime, not its commission. The
witness may always modify his earlier testimony as he explains it to
make it true, and thus avoid the compelled commission of a crime.
Truthful testimony given prior to perjurious testimony is not privileged insofar as it tends to prove the subsequent perjury, and hence need'
not be immunized. This follows from the absence of privilege for prospective crimes (with the exception of testimony that would disclose an
intent to commit the future crime).220 Truthful testimony interwoven
with perjurious testimony must be evaluated on the basis of whether it is
privileged because of prior perjury-the answer to each question may be
privileged, depending upon the witness's previous testimony.
Determining which immunized testimony is truthful, and hence
possibly privileged and not useable if given subsequent to perjury, does
not present an insurmountable problem. It appears that the matter cannot be left to a jury unless one trusts the effectiveness of an instruction
such as: "Do not use any immunized testimony for any purpose unless
you first determine that the testimony was willfully false." The
218 Se United States v. Apfelbaum, 584 F.2d 1264, 1270 n.9 (3d Cir. 1978) (admitting
immunized testimony essential to show context of perjury), reo'don othergrounds, 445 U.S. 115
(1980). Offering testimony to show context would be a "witness" use under the privilege,
since the context is a matter of the words' meaning, and meaning is bound up with the ideas
of the speaker.
219 "Materiality" as an element of perjury is a matter of affecting the proceedings. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 241.1(1), (2) & Commentary (Official Draft and Rev. Comments 1980). The
meaning of testimony is one factor determining the effect on proceedings.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 85-97.
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Supreme Court has indicated that if the jury would naturally wish to
use evidence which might ultimately be found inadmissible for any purpose, such evidence cannot be admitted, even conditionally. 22' Neverthless, the practical problem of administering immunity in this
context-i.e., determining whether testimony was willfully false before
letting the jury hear it--did not overwhelm those courts whose handling
of the Apfelbaum issues differed from that of the Supreme Court in that
case. These lower courts ruled that the judge may make the determination of falsity at various stages of the case.2 22 Indeed, in Apfe/baum itself
the trial judge determined at a post-verdict hearing that the testimony
in question was false. 223 A determination of truthfulness might cause a

mistrial, depending upon whether the immunized testimony, now "discovered" to be truthful, prejudiced the verdict under the harmless error
standard. 22 4 Even testimony charged in the indictment to be perjurious
could ultimately be found truthful and prejudicial to the defendant. If
a jury convicted a defendant regarding indicted testimony, however, a
judge's finding of truthfulness would be rare. Further, if a limiting instruction has been given, one could easily infer from the jury's acquittal
a lack of prejudice to the guilty portion of the verdict. Here, the defendant would get two opportunities at a finding of truthfulness, before both
the jury and the judge. The result is that prosecutors must be somewhat
conservative in offering any immunized testimony in a perjury trial.
Such is an unavoidable consequence of the fifth amendment.
A knottier problem is the fifth amendment right not to cause a
prosecutor to focus upon oneself and not to supply investigatory leads
through one's compelled testimony. 225 An immunized witness's truthful
testimony may alert the prosecutor that the witness recently committed
perjury. To say the prosecutor must ignore possible perjury is not absurd. He must always look the other way when dealing with immunized
witnesses. 226 The privilege is not forfeited merely because it is the witness who both committed the crime and then reveals it-such is the paradigmatic case of immunity in operation. Under accepted immunity
analysis, a prosecutor cannot be permitted to draw evidentiary leads
221 See supra text accompanying notes 156-58; cf. FED. R. EvID. 104(a) (judge determining
admissibility). But see United States v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1015 (1978).
222 See United States v. Berardelli, 565 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1977), and cases cited therein.
223 Appendix at 79, 76, 23, 25, United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980); see supra
note 23.
224 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
225 See supra note 82; cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972) (immunity
extends to use of evidence obtained by "focusing investigation on a witness as result of his
compelled disclosure").
226 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-62 (1972); infra note 241.
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from the truthful testimony. 227
The "focussing" effect can occur because the truthful testimony is
sufficiently inconsistent with prior testimony to attract attention. It
would then seem psychologically impossible for the prosecutor to avoid
suspecting the witness to be a perjurer; how the problem can be handled
is discussed below in connection with inconsistent perjury. 228 A witness
might draw attention to himself not by inconsistency but by unconvincing testimony. In such cases, the testimony will usually be willfully false
and therefore not immunized. If truthful testimony somehow draws attention to earlier perjury, however, the prosecutor simply cannot be allowed to violate the privilege by deciding to prosecute because of a
chain of events commencing with truthful, compelled, incriminatory,
immunized testimony. That a'crime has earlier been committed in the
prosecutor's presence and is now being revealed in his presence does not
create an exception to the fifth amendment. Neither is there an exception for grand jury perjurers who suddenly tell the truth. The most brazenly obstreperous witnesses can be dealt with, however, as will now be
explained.
3. Inconsistent Petiuy
Inconsistent perjury is perjurious testimony whose falsity is shown
by proving that the witness has made irreconciliably contradictory declarations. 22 9 The indictment need not specify which declaration is false
if each declaration was material and made within the statute of limita23 0
tion for the offense charged.
Taking the witness-defendant's statements in chronological order, if
statement I was given under immunity but is perjurious, it is nonetheless admissible because it is not privileged.2 31 If the statement is not perjurious, it is not privileged regarding a crime committed thereafter,
namely, the subsequent false, inconsistent statement. 232 Note that while
227 See supra note 17 and text accompanying.
228 See infra text accompanying notes 236-40.

229 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1976).
230 [d. In Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100 (1979), the Court had granted certiorari on
the question whether immunized testimony may be used to prove inconsistent perjury, but
disposed of the case without reaching that issue. Id. at 105.
231 See supra text accompanying note 209.
232 See supra text accompanying notes 85-97.
There is no contradiction between holding that the first statement is not privileged regarding inconsistent perjury (or any other prospective crime) and stating that certain persons
are privileged from supplying material for impeachment by inconsistent statement. See supra
text accompanying notes 160-81. Under the thesis argued in this Article, individuals who are
privileged regarding impeachment material face a reasonable possibility of prosecution for a
crime already allegedly committed. See supra text accompanying notes 177-81. By contrast,
the likelihood of being prosecuted for inconsistent perjury committed after invocation of the
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the indictment need not proceed on the theory that the second statement was false, actual falsity would still be perjury and therefore a prospective crime.
If statement 2 was given under immunity it is not admissible because the witness had a privilege not to expose his prior perjury. 233 An
exception is that if the court determines that statement 2 was willfully
false, it would be admissible, as would any perjurious testimony. 234 A
judge must find perjuriousness in limine, since a jury might otherwise use
beliefs, truthfully revealed through statement 2, in violation of the privilege for concluding that the witness was wilfully false in statement 1.235
If a witness dares to contradict himself on a single immunized occasion-a problem that apparently does not seriously concern the Justice
Department 23 6 -the necessity for proving statement 2 to be false as a
condition of admissibility will not leave the prosecutor helpless. When a
witness's testimony tends to obstruct justice by closing off avenues of
inquiry, 23 7 or the testimony shows "beyond any doubt whatever" that
he is refusing to tell what he knows,2 38 the witness has committed the
crime of contempt. The contradictor has "closed off avenues of inquiry"
because he gives his interrogator and the tribunal no path to follow.
The testimony also shows beyond "any doubt whatever" that he is not
telling what he knows: he is telling nothing while not affirming that he
knows nothing. Using statement 2 to prove contempt would not violate
the privilege, because we can infer that one who blatantly contradicts
himself on a single occasion is acting with criminal intent when each
statement is given. 239 Just as the privilege does not cover willfully false
statements, so should it not cover statements made pursuant to a plan to
privilege is not strong enough to warrant fifth amendment protection, since it involves a prospective crime. See supra text accompanying notes 85-97. Of course, both types of individuals,
those who have allegedly committed a prior crime and those who have not, face an equal
chance of innocent self-contradiction, but that is hardly reason to suppose they face equal
chances of prosecution; compare the chance of being prosecuted for perjury based on an
innocent contradiction, with the chance of first being prosecuted for an already suspected
crime allegedly committed prior to the contradiction and then being impeached by the contradiction at one's trial.
233 See United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970
(1977).
234 See supra text accompanying note 209.
235 Even in an inconsistent perjury prosecution the jury must find that the witness acted
knowingly. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1976).
236 See Brief for the United States at 67-68 & n.24, Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100
(1979) ("it would require a particularly brazen witness" to give two contradictory answers to
every grand jury question; example is apparently given to diagram the problem raised by
immunity and inconsistent perjury).
237 United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979).
238 United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (L. Hand, J.).
239 Compare the likelihood that innocent change of belief was the cause of different testimony given on different occasions. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
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commit a crime by using words; the speaker is a "witness" under the
privilege only when he is revealing his beliefs, not when he is using
words as an instrument of crime with disregard for whether he is revealing his beliefs. Thus, the single-occasion self-contradictor cannot by
contemptuous inconsistency evade the duty to give testimony. Statement 2 is admissible in this situation to prove the statement was indeed
made and to prove the witness's criminal intent in its making. Neither
of these uses would be a "witness" use of the statement because neither
use exploits the witness's beliefs, which presumably did not change between contradictory statements 1 and 2 if they were made on a single
occasion and without explanation. 240 There would, moreover, be no
problems with using statement 1 to prove contempt for the reasons
given above in connection with inconsistent perjury.
Finally, if statement 2 is immunized on an occasion other than that
when statement I was given, the above analysis would not excuse
prosecutorial focus on the witness. 24 1 Since, however, statement 2 is
inadmissible unless perjurious in itself, no perjury prosecution can result
in any event absent reason to believe the statement was false; mere contradiction with a prior statement will be insufficient. This gutting of the
inconsistent perjury statute is unavoidable but understandable when
one considers that if a perjurer has a change of heart and wishes to be
honest the next time he testifies, he has the usual privilege not to expose
his crime, and must receive the usual immunity if nonetheless compelled
to speak.242 If a prosecutor is concerned that a grand jury witness whom
he has "turned" will recant at trial, 243 the prosecutor should not work
with this witness through testimonial immunity, but should use an
agreement not to prosecute, 244 which can be conditioned on the witness's non-contradiction of his interview statements. Prosecutorial immunity usually gives away nothing additional, as many witnesses who
currently receive testimonial immunity would not have been prosecuted
240 See supra note 239.
241 Cf. United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970
(1977) (apprehension of focusing on witness because of truthful statement contradicting ear-

lier statement triggers the privilege; logical implication is that focusing is forbidden if witness
is immunized during second statement).
242 See United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970
(1977); cf. United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931
(1977) (perjury exception to immunity does not extend to inconsistent perjury prosecution
based in part on statement prior to immunity); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 644 F.2d 348
(5th Cir. 1981) (same).
243 Inconsistent perjury statutes are designed for those who testify and thereafter retract
their testimony. Ste MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 219, § 241.1 commentary at 134-35.
244 See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 661 F.2d 1145, 1147, cert.
granted sub nom. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
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anyway because of their cooperation. 245 In fact, it is extremely unlikely
that a witness who has testified about his crime under testimonial immunity can be prosecuted for that crime. 246 In the case of witnesses who
are compelled to testify under testimonial immunity and who would not
cooperate with the prosecution, the subsequent testimony furnishes evidence and reason to focus upon them for perjury and is not immunized
if found to be false. If the latter testimony is true, then nothing substantial has been lost to the prosecutor through inability to use the inconsistent perjury statute. This follows because truthful testimony, by
hypothesis, has been given on the second, usually more important, occasion (e.g., trial following earlier grand jury testimony).
D.

IMMUNITY STATUTES

The Constitution does not require that immunity be as broad as the
construction given the current federal immunity statute in Kastizar.
That statute provides:
[N]o testimony or other information compelled under the [immunity] order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony
or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case,
except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise fail247
ing to comply with the order.
Kastigar said the statute forbids prosecutors from "using the compelled
testimony in any respect," 248 but, as we have seen, an immunity that
broad is not constitutionally compelled. Indeed, there is no constitutional reason for an immunity statute to immunize all compelled testimony from later use as proof of guilt.2 4 9 Only privileged testimony must
be immunized.
Unlike the non-immunity situation, in which the witness who
claims the privilege is entitled to keep his proposed testimony secret
when he argues his right to the privilege, 250 once a witness testifies under
immunity the information is made public. There is thus no reason not
to use the testimony itself to determine whether in fact the privilege
existed. If an answer did not imperil the witness protected by the privilege, the Constitution does not require that the answer receive immunity
from any use. An immunized witness could be made to demonstrate the
privileged nature of each answer, just as non-immunized witnesses must
25 1
claim and demonstrate privilege, seriatim, as to each question.
See Wolfson, Immuniy-How itWorks in Real Life, 67 J. CRIM. L. & C. 167, 167 (1976).
See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976).
406 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
See supra note 122.
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 48-87 (1951).
251 See, id.

245
246
247
248
249
250
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If Congress wishes to grant the minimal immunity constitutionally
required, 252 two possibilities exist. One is for the Court, at the next opportunity, to reinterpret the existing statute so that the terms "against"
and "witness" have the same meaning as they do in the text of the privilege. The statutory language would be applied from the perspective of
the situation existing when the questions were asked, thereby imposing
symmetry between immunity and privilege.
If the Court is recalcitrant, Congress should enact a replacement
statute: "No testimony or other information compelled under an immunity order which the witness would have been privileged under the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution not to give may be used
in any manner which would violate that privilege. ' 253 The present exceptions to the existing statute, including perjury, are omitted as superfluous. 254 The "derived" provision of the present statute is similarly
omitted because derivative use is encompassed by the incorporation of
the privilege. The proposed statute would simply immunize those persons who in fact had a privilege from uses of their testimony which
would violate their privilege. 255 The statute might be unwise as a matter of policy, 256 but Congress has apparently already chosen that policy. 257 An examination of policy is beyond the scope of this Article,
which has dealt with the constitutionally required scope of testimonial
privilege.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in New Jersy v.Portash made an impermissible
leap from Kastigar-aprecedent which construed and upheld a federal
statute on the grounds that the scope of immunized testimony is as
broad as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination-to a
conclusion which framed a constitutional requirement that a witness
252 The Supreme Court has already held that Congress indeed intended this. Apfelbaum
v. United States, 445 U.S. 115, 121-23 (1980).
253 The Court has not objected to the drafting technique of incorporating the Constitution
as an element of a statute. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977)
(validity of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976), which allows government appeals unless prohibited by
"double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution;" drafting issue apparently not
raised).
254 See Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 141 (1913) (perjury exception is superfluous);
Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 143 (1911) (reading perjury exception into statute).
255 A logical extension of this statute would be to prohibit invocation of the privilege and
grant everybody immunity to the extent their privilege is violated. This might cause unnecessary "taint" hearings, however, under Kastlgar.
256 See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

765-66

(5th ed. 1980) (witnesses might be more responsive if counsel can advise them their testimony
cannot be used in any circumstances).
257 See supra note 252.
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can not be impeached by use of his immunized grand jury testimony.
Shortly afterward, the Court in United States v. Apfelbaum imposed a requirement of isomorphism between immunity and privilege. That requirement was a sound analysis, but left Portash's justification
groundless: had the Portash Court intended to create a privilege
grounded on impeachment, or did the Court simply prohibit all testimonial uses of immunized testimony on the theory that no one receives
immunity without a prior attachment of the privilege? The problem is
a lack of principle; Apfelbaum correctly precludes granting blanket immunity merely because the witness had a privilege on some ground.
This Article has shown that the Portash result can be justified by
recognizing the isomorphic relation between the privilege and immunity. This Article, then, extends the Court's finding of isomorphism to
its logical conclusion: a view of privilege somewhat broader than recognized by case law, but one that has not been rejected by the courts.
Most troublesome is Justice Rehnquist's careless application of the isomorphism principle he quite properly expounded in Apfelbaum. To say
that perjury sweeps away immunity entirely evades the (not too difficult) analysis which must be performed in every perjury-immunity case.
The privilege has its genesis in the Bill of Rights; immunity comes only
from legislatures and prosecutors. Surely the latter cannot indiscriminately blot out the former.
Postscript
While this Article was in the galley stage, the Supreme Court decided a case discussed herein, Pillsbuy Co. v. Conboy.258 In a five-to-two
decision, the Court held that when a previously immunized witness is
subpoenaed to give a civil deposition in response to questions based on
his immunized testimony, the federal immunity statute does not authorize the civil judge to compel his testimony over his invocation of the fifth
amendment privilege. The Court reasoned that the immunity does not
extend to the deposition, even if the deposition were inadmissable at a
subsequent criminal trial of the witness-a matter not passed upon by
the Court.2 59 The reasons given for this conclusion were: (1) cross-examination at the deposition might be broader than the direct examination; (2) the government, not the court, has exclusive power to shape the
scope of immunity; and (3) the civil court, by adjudicating the scope of
immunity, would merely be predicting what a future criminal court
might determine on the issue of taint of the prosecutor's evidence.
The Court rejected the parties' position that the issue was whether
258 51 U.S.L.W. 4061 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 143-50.
259 51 U.S.L.W. at 4063 n.13; id. at 4064, text accompanying n.22.
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the deposition "derived" from the immunized testimony within the
meaning of the immunity statute. For the Court, the issue was whether
the grant of immunity "itself compelled" the witness to give the deposition. 260 For the sake of brevity, it can only be said that the Court's
avowed "interest" analysis is, in the word of dissenting Justice Stevens,
"puzzl[ing]."1261 Once the majority separated the scope-of-immunity issue from the admissibility of the deposition at a subsequent prosecution
of the witness, all hope for isomorphism between immunity and the
privilege against self-incrimination was lost.

260 Id. at 4063.
261 Id. at 4070.

